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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On September 20, 2011, the United States Central Intelligence Agency 
(“CIA”) killed an American citizen in Yemen via a targeted drone strike.1 
This is only one example from a long list of drone attacks attributable to 
the CIA, but is quite possibly the most controversial.2  Over the last ten 
years, the CIA has become increasingly involved in the “war on terror.”3  
The drone strikes began in November 2002, when the CIA used a 
Predator unmanned aerial vehicle to kill suspected al Qaeda leader Qaed 
Salim Sinan al-Harethi, also in Yemen.4  Between 2004 and 2008 there 
1. Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a Citizen, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 8, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/world/middleeast/secret-us-
memo-made-legal-case-to-kill-a-citizen.html?pagewanted=all. 
2. Id. (The administration has faced a legal challenge and public criticism for
targeting Aulaqi, who was born in New Mexico, because of constitutional protections 
afforded U.S. citizens.); see also Spencer Ackerman, Was Killing Al-Qaida’s YouTube 
Preacher Illegal?, WIRED (Sept. 30, 2011, 12:42 PM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/ 
2011/09/awlaki-illegal-or-legal/ (discussing the legality of targeting an American citizen 
without due process of law). 
3. Greg Miller, CIA Digs in as Americans Withdraw from Iraq, Afghanistan,
WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cia-
digs-in-as-americans-withdraw-from-iraq-afghanistan/2012/02/07/gIQAFNJTxQ_story. 
html (“CIA paramilitary operatives were the first US personnel to enter Afghanistan after 
the Sept. 11 attacks.”). 
4. US Kills al-Qaeda Suspect in Yemen, USA TODAY, Nov. 5, 2002, http://www.
usatoday.com/news/world/2002-11-04-yemen-explosion_x.htm. 
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were an estimated forty-six such drone strikes,5 and at least sixty-nine in 
2009 alone.6  The number of drone strikes in 2010 was nearly double 
2009’s figure.7  Drone strikes in the region have continued, and the U.S. 
government plans to keep a CIA presence in Afghanistan after the troop 
withdrawal for the purpose of maintaining airstrip access, which will 
allow the CIA to further use drones for targeting al Qaeda members in 
Pakistan.8 
Since the war on terror began in 2001, there has been much debate 
surrounding the legality of conducting such a war, and what legal rights 
and protections, if any, members of al Qaeda and their supporters must 
receive.  But what is the legal status of those individuals who target 
members of al Qaeda on behalf of the United States?  Are there are any 
legal consequences for “pushing the button” on the drone that carried out 
the targeted killing?  At first glance, it appears that members of the 
American armed forces involved in the drone strikes are combatants, and 
combatants have the lawful right to target the enemy.  However, CIA 
officers are the individuals carrying out many of the drone strikes, 
particularly in areas not officially considered to be in the combat zone, 
such as Yemen, Pakistan, and Somalia.9  The CIA is a civilian agency 
that gathers intelligence for the purpose of advising senior United States 
policymakers.10  Civilians cannot participate in an armed conflict as they 
are not combatants; thus, many questions arise regarding the legal status 
5. Afsheen John Radsan & Richard Murphy, Measure Twice, Shoot Once: Higher 
Care for CIA-Targeted Killing, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1201, 1216 (2011). 
6. Christopher Drew, Drones are Playing a Growing Role in Afghanistan, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 19, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/20/world/asia/20drones.html; 
see also Philip Alston, The CIA and Targeted Killing Beyond Borders, 2 HARV. NAT’L 
SEC. J. 283, 286 (2011) (“The CIA’s drone-based killing programs have so far killed well 
in excess of 2,000 persons in Pakistan, and it has been involved in such drone programs 
in at least four other countries.”). 
7. Ryan J. Vogel, Drone Warfare and the Law of Armed Conflict, 39 DENV. J. 
INT’L L. & POL’Y 101, 105 (2010). 
8. Miller, supra note 3.
9. Drew, supra note 6; Greg Miller, CIA Seeks New Authority to Expand Yemen
Drone Campaign, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ 
national-security/cia-seeks-new-authority-to-expand-yemen-drone-campaign/2012/04/18/gIQ 
AsaumRT_story.html; Declan Walsh, US Extends Drone Strikes to Somalia, THE GUARDIAN 
June 30, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/30/us-drone-strikes-somalia. 
10. Today’s CIA, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (Apr. 5, 2007), https://www.cia.gov 
/about-cia/todays-cia/index.html; see also Radsan & Murphy, supra note 5, at 1206 
(“[T]hey are not part of a military chain of command, do not wear uniforms, and are not 
trained in the laws of war.”). 
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of the CIA officers due to their participation in the war on terror.  
Specifically, are CIA officers combatants or civilians who are directly 
participating in hostilities, and what are the implications of their legal 
status? 
The United States justifies targeted drone strikes with the 2001 
Authorization of the Use of Military Force (“Authorization”),11 which 
gives the U.S. President the power to use force against suspected 
terrorists.12  The Authorization is predicated upon the argument that the 
September 11, 2001 terror attacks were an armed attack on the United 
States, permitting a response of force toward those responsible.13  Thus, 
this article will examine international humanitarian law to determine 
whether the CIA officers are operating in a situation of armed conflict 
and to decide which legal classification applies to the CIA officers.  
Customary international law and the case law and statutes of the 
international courts, and the ad hoc and hybrid tribunals, including the 
International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 
the International Criminal Court, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
will inform these analyses.14  The case law of the Supreme Court of 
 
 11.   See Vogel, supra note 7, at 107; Authorization for Use of Military Force, 
Pub. L. No. 107–40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
 12.   Cheri Kramer, The Legality of Targeted Drone Attacks as U.S. Policy, 9 
SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 375, 378 (2011) (The Authorization gives the President of the 
United States “the power ‘to use all necessary and appropriate force’ against those 
responsible for the terrorists [sic] attacks realized in New York, Virginia, and Pennsylvania 
on September 11, 2001.”). 
 13.   Vogel supra note 7, at 108; see also Allen S. Weiner, Law, Just War, and the 
International Fight Against Terrorism: Is It War? in INTERVENTION, TERRORISM, AND 
TORTURE 137, 141 (Steven P. Lee ed., 2007) (“On September 11, the United States 
sustained an assault that qualifies, in scale and effect, as an ‘armed attack’ that would 
justify the use of force in self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.”). 
 14.   See Marco Odello, Fundamental Standards of Humanity: A Common Language 
of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, in INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: TOWARDS A NEW MERGER IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 15, 35 (Roberta Arnold & Noelle Quenivet, eds. 2008) (Case law 
of international courts and tribunals “is important for the interpretation and clarification 
of international rules, the identification of customary international law, all the more as 
judicial decisions are considered a subsidiary source of international law by Article 38(d) 
of the Statute of the ICJ.”); see also Stephen Mathias, The United States and the Security 
Council, in THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE USE OF FORCE 173, 175 (Niels Blokker & 
Nico Schrijver eds. 2005) (The United States is a member of the United Nations Security 
Council; as such, it supported the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone.); see also GARY SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 15 (2010) (The term “case law” in the law 
of armed conflict “refers to decisions of domestic courts, military tribunals, and international 
courts that relate to IHL and [the law of armed conflict.]”). 
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Israel will be referenced, as Israel takes the same position as the United 
States with regard to the legality of targeting terrorists via drone strike.  
The specific international treaties signed and/ratified by the United 
States will be examined to determine any applicable legal obligations.  
Finally, news articles will be used to identify the CIA’s actual role in the 
targeted killings, as there has been little official acknowledgement of the 
CIA’s involvement.15 
Section II of this article introduces international humanitarian law as 
the applicable legal standard, and develops the distinction between 
international and non-international armed conflict.  This section will define 
the key elements used to determine whether a situation of hostilities rises 
to the level of an armed conflict:  the intensity of the conflict  and the 
organization of the parties.  Furthermore, this section will analyze the 
idea of internationalized armed conflict and examine the standard for 
determining when an attack by an armed group may be attributed to a 
State.  Section III of this article describes the different categories of actors 
found in situations of armed conflict, including combatants, noncombatants, 
and civilians.  This section also discusses members of organized armed 
groups, terrorists, and unlawful combatants, and analyzes whether they 
are recognized classifications under international humanitarian law.  The 
principles of “direct participation in hostilities” (“DPH”) and “continuous 
combat function” (“CCF”) are introduced and distinguished here.  Section 
IV of this article discusses the legality of targeted killings.  This section 
also examines the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter, 
and whether it permits States to use force against non-State actors.  Finally, 
Section V of this article examines the facts surrounding drone strikes 
conducted by the United States.  It first considers which legal forum the 
United States is operating in with regard to the locations of the drone 
strikes; specifically, whether it is an armed conflict and whether the United 
States may lawfully assert its right of self-defense against al Qaeda.  It 
concludes with an analysis of the legal status of the CIA officers who are 
participating in the drone strikes and the potential legal consequences of 
that status. 
 
 15.   Alston, supra note 6, at 299 (“A great deal of the relevant information  
[surrounding targeted killings] is classified.”). 
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II.  INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AS THE APPLICABLE                 
LEGAL STANDARD 
When analyzing the legal status of a participant in a drone strike 
targeting members of al Qaeda and their supporters, it is imperative that 
the proper set of legal rules are applied to that targeted killing.16  The 
official position of the United States is that the Authorization permits the 
waging of war against terrorists, and international humanitarian law 
(“IHL”) applies.17  This Article will therefore analyze the legal status of 
the CIA officers engaged in drone attacks using the principles of IHL. 
At its most basic applicability, IHL operates in situations of armed 
conflict and governs the conduct of hostilities (“jus in bello”);18 it is 
considered the lex specialis applicable during an armed conflict.19  IHL 
is the set of rules that attempts to alleviate the effects of  war on 
individuals,20 and its primary purpose is to govern the relationship between 
a State and the citizens of its enemy during those times of armed 
 
 16.  See, e.g., Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, 
Study on targeted killings, Human Rights Council, ¶ 28, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 
(May 28, 2010) (by Philip Alston), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ 
hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add6.pdf [hereinafter Targeted Killings Study] 
(“Whether or not a specific targeted killing is legal depends on the context in which it is 
conducted: whether in armed conflict, outside armed conflict, or in relation to the 
inter-state use of force.”); Kenneth Watkin, Humanitarian Law and 21st Century 
Conflict: Three Block Wars, Terrorism, and Complex Security Situations, in TESTING THE 
BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 1, 25 (Susan C. Breau & Agnieszka 
Jachec-Neale eds., 2006) (“Since international law only recognizes two normative 
structures: international humanitarian law and international human rights law a significant 
legal challenge results in their application to the tripartite categorization of conflict.”). 
 17.   See, e.g., Vogel, supra note 7, at 102 n.5; Ackerman, supra note 2; Alston, 
supra note 6, at 321 (Harold Koh, the former the United States Department of State 
Legal Adviser, stated the legal basis for the targeted killings is that “‘the United States is 
in an armed conflict with al Qaeda, as well as the Taliban and associated forces, in 
response to the horrific 9/11 attacks.’”). 
 18.   See, e.g., Christopher Greenwood, Historical Development and Legal Basis in 
THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 1, 12 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2d ed. 
2010) (International humanitarian law “is chiefly concerned with the abnormal conditions 
of armed conflict.”); Conor McCarthy, Legal Conclusion or Interpretive Process? Lex 
Specialis and the Applicability of International Human Rights Standards, in INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: TOWARDS A NEW MERGER IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 101, 101 (Roberta Arnold & Noelle Quenivet eds., 2008) (“[H]umanitarian law is 
conceived of specifically to address the kinds of situations which arise in warfare and the 
dynamics which underpins them[.]”); Judith Gardam, The Contribution of the International 
Court of Justice to International Humanitarian Law, 14 LEIDEN J. INT’L LAW 349, 352 (2001) 
(“The name IHL is recently coined for what was previously known as the law of war[.]”). 
 19.   HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov’t of Isr. para. 18 
[2005] (Isr.) [hereinafter Israel Case]. 
 20.   SOLIS, supra note 14, at 22. 
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conflict.21  IHL applies to all parties caught in the conflict, and sets the 
rules governing the conduct of the hostilities.22  IHL also attempts to 
place limits on the way States use force in armed conflict, particularly by 
prohibiting certain methods of warfare, or, for example, by requiring that 
attacks may only be directed toward valid military objectives.23  The two 
primary sources of IHL are treaties and custom.24 
The United States military specifically recognizes these two sources of 
IHL;25 thus, any principle identified as “customary” in this article will 
apply to U.S. action.  Furthermore, the United States is a party to all four 
 
 21.   Greenwood, supra note 18. 
 22.   William Abresch, A Human Rights Law of Internal Armed Conflict: The 
European Court of Human Rights in Chechnya, 16 EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 741, 743 (2005). 
 23.   Greenwood, supra note 18, at 13. 
 24.   See Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian 
Law: A Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed 
Conflict, 87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 178 (2005) [hereinafter ICRC Study] (“It is widely 
agreed that the existence of a rule of customary international law requires the presence of 
two elements, namely State practice (usus) and a belief that such practice is required, 
prohibited or allowed, depending on the nature of the rule, as a matter of law[.]”); see 
Greenwood, supra note 18, at 12 (“[O]nce it is established that a humanitarian law treaty 
is binding upon states on both sides in a conflict, the application of the treaty is not 
dependent upon reciprocity. . .it is not necessary today that all the states involved in a 
conflict must be parties to a particular humanitarian treaty for that treaty to apply in the 
conflict.”); see also Noelle Quenivet, The History of the Relationship Between International 
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: TOWARDS A NEW MERGER IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 2 (Roberta 
Arnold & Noelle Quenivet eds., 2008) (“While IHL mainly grew via customary law, its 
first treaty codification dates back to 1864 when the Geneva Convention of August 22, 
1864 for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field was 
drafted.”); see SOLIS, supra note 14, at 14 (“[C]ustom remains the basis of much of the 
law of war.”). 
 25.  See DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, ARMY FIELD MANUAL NO. 27-10, THE LAW OF 
LAND WARFARE 4 (1956) available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/law_ 
warfare-1956.pdf (last visited Aug. 12, 2013) (“The law of war is derived from two 
principal sources . . . Lawmaking Treaties (or Conventions), such as the Hague and 
Geneva Conventions [and] [c]ustom. Although some of the law of war has not been 
incorporated in any treaty or convention to which the United States is a party, this body 
of unwritten or customary law is firmly established by the custom of nations and well 
defined by recognized authorities on international law.”); see also DEPARTMENT OF THE 
ARMY, ARMY FIELD MANUAL NO. 3-24 AND MARINE CORPS WARFIGHTING PUBLICATION 
NO. 30-33.5, COUNTERINSURGENCY D-3 (2006), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/ 
army/fm3-24.pdf (last visited Aug. 12, 2013) (“U.S. forces obey the law of war.  The law 
of war is a body of international treaties and customs, recognized by the United States as 
binding.  It regulates the conduct of hostilities and protects noncombatants.  The main 
law of war protections come from the Hague and Geneva Conventions.”). 
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1949 Geneva Conventions (“Geneva Conventions”), which form part of 
the core principles of IHL,26 and “apply as treaties in almost any 
international armed conflict.”27  Indeed, almost all of the Geneva 
Conventions’ provisions are considered to be customary international 
law.28  The United States has also signed and ratified the United Nations 
(“UN”) Charter, which contains provisions governing when States may 
resort to the use of force (“jus ad bellum”).29  The United States has 
relied heavily on the self-defense provision in the UN Charter to justify 
the targeting and killing of suspected members of al Qaeda, the Taliban, 
and their supporters in Yemen, Pakistan, and Somalia, which will be 
discussed further in section V(A) below. 
A.  Legal Status of the Conflict 
The first step in analyzing the legal status of a person conducting a 
drone strike is to decide whether the strike will occur in an international 
armed conflict or a non-international armed conflict.  This determination 
is important not only because it dictates the applicable legal standard,30 
but also because it establishes the legal status of the actors involved and 
the possible consequences of their involvement.31 
 
 26.   See LESLIE C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 93 (3d 
ed., Manchester Univ. Press, 2008) (1993). 
 27.   Greenwood, supra note 18, at 28. 
 28.   ICRC Study, supra note 24, at 187 (“The great majority of the provisions of 
the Geneva Conventions, including common Article 3, are considered to be part of 
customary international law.”); see also Odello, supra note 14, at 43 (“[T]he norms 
enumerated in Common Article 3 to the [Geneva Conventions] are declaratory of substantive 
customary international law, and they constitute a minimum yardstick for all types of 
armed conflict.”). 
 29.   Greenwood, supra note 18, at 2. 
 30.   RENE PROVOST, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW 
244 (2002) (“In human rights as well as in humanitarian law, initial characterisation 
plays a key role, because the classification of a given situation as a state of emergency or 
an armed conflict may render one or the other legal system nearly or totally inapplicable.”); 
see also Roberta Arnold, The New War on Terror: Legal Implications under International 
Humanitarian Law, in TESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW 85, 89 (Susan C. Breau & Agnieszka Jachec-Neale eds., 2006) (“IHL requires the 
existence of an armed conflict in order to apply.”); SOLIS, supra note 14, at 149 (“In 
determining conflict status, one asks what law of war, if any, applies in the armed 
conflict under consideration[.]”). 
 31.   See, e.g., Watkin, supra note 16, at 25 (The protections of the Geneva 
Conventions “are clearly triggered by the existence of an armed conflict between 
States.”); Mary Ellen O’Connell, Combatants and the Combat Zone, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 
845, 853 (2009) (“To know who is a combatant, therefore, requires knowing the meaning 
of armed conflict.”); Dieter Fleck, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflicts in THE 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 605, 627 (Dieter Fleck ed. 2008) 
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1.  What is “Armed Conflict?” 
The 1949 Geneva Conventions were the first to introduce “armed 
conflict” as a concept distinct from “war.”32  Unfortunately, the Geneva 
Conventions do not provide an exact definition of armed conflict.33  But 
armed conflict is not limited to the use of force between armed forces; 
the Geneva Conventions allow for an armed conflict to result from the 
unauthorized crossing of armed forces into a State’s territory, or from 
situations that are not met with resistance, such as aerial bombings or 
invasions.34  Regardless of the context, situations of armed conflict can 
only arise from the use of force by the organs of a State.35  The 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), in 
the first international war crimes trial since the ones in Nuremberg and 
Tokyo,36 followed this requirement and defined an armed conflict as “a 
resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence 
between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or 
between such groups within a State.”37  Thus, the two elements found in 
 
(“A distinction between international and non-international armed conflict remains part 
of the law of armed conflict, most especially for purposes of the status of fighters.”). 
 32.   See PROVOST, supra note 30, at 248 (“The notion of ‘international armed 
conflict’ evolved as a separate concept from ‘war’ only recently, through the adoption 
after the Second World War of the UN Charter and the 1949 Geneva Conventions.”). 
 33.   See, e.g., Christopher Greenwood, Scope of Application of Humanitarian 
Law, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 45, 75 (Dieter Fleck 
ed., 2d ed. 2010) [hereinafter Scope of Application] (“The Geneva Conventions do not 
define ‘armed conflict,’ an omission which was apparently deliberate, since it was hoped 
that this term would continue to be purely factual and not become laden  with 
technicalities as did the definition of war.”); SOLIS supra note 14, at 149 (“[T]here is no 
‘bright line test,’ no formula to determine whether there is an armed conflict in 
progress[.]”). 
 34.   CRYER, R. ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND 
PROCEDURE 279 (2d ed. 2010). 
 35.   Greenwood, supra note 18, at 48. 
 36.   See Landmark Cases, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER 
YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/sid/10314 (last visited Aug. 11, 2013). 
 37.   Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Appeals Decision on the Defense 
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995), http://icty.org/x/cases/Tadić/acdec/en/51002.htm [hereinafter 
“Tadić Appeals Decision”]; see also Watkin, supra note 16, at 38 (“This decision is 
significant in a number of respects.  First, it provided a definition of ‘armed conflict’ that 
referred to conflict not only between States, but also with ‘organized armed groups.’  
Secondly, that same definition also recognized a territorial aspect of the conflict based on 
‘control.’”). 
CLINE (DO NOT DELETE, OR ADD TEXT IN THIS AREA) 10/19/2016  5:20 PM 
 
60 
all armed conflicts are: an organized armed group and fighting of some 
intensity.38  These elements will be discussed further in section II(B)(iii). 
2.  International Armed Conflict 
The bright line rule is that an armed conflict is international when two 
or more States use armed force against each other.39  Therefore, the 
conflict’s intensity, duration, and scale are not relevant to the determination 
so long as the conflict is between two States.40  International armed 
conflict will also occur where the territory of a State is partially or 
completely occupied, regardless of whether that occupation is resisted 
with force.41 
Common Article 2, paragraph 1 of the Geneva Conventions dictates 
that the Conventions are applicable in all cases of officially declared 
war, or in situations of armed conflict arising between two or more States, 
regardless of whether one of the States recognizes a “state of war.”42  
This means IHL will apply to all situations of international armed conflict.43  
The rules of IHL apply equally to all parties involved in the armed conflict, 
regardless of which State was the instigator,44 or whether the State 
 
 38.   O’Connell, supra note 31, at 854; cf. Agnieszka Jachec-Neale, End Justifies 
the Means? Post 9/11 Contempt for Humane Treatment, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: TOWARDS A NEW MERGER IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 57, 69 
(Roberta Arnold & Noelle Quenivet eds., 2008) (“Crucial therefore to the analysis of the 
legal framework of armed conflict will be the intensity and the level of disruption in the 
first place . . . and the parties to the conflict.”). 
 39.   See e.g., Greenwood, supra note 18, at 46 (An armed conflict is international 
“if one state uses force of arms against another state.”); Odello, supra note 14, at 23 
(“International armed conflicts are situations where two or more states are involved in 
the use of armed force.”); SOLIS, supra note 14, at 150 (“In a common Article 2 conflict 
—an international armed conflict—two or more states are engaged in armed conflict 
against each other.”). 
 40.   Targeted Killings Study, supra note 16, ¶ 51. 
 41.   Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Confirmation of 
Charges, ¶ 209 (Jan. 29, 2007), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc266175.PDF 
[hereinafter Lubanga Decision on the Confirmation of Charges]; see also Targeted 
Killings Study, supra note 16, ¶ 51 (“The IHL of international armed conflict applies also 
to ‘all cases of total or partial occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party’ to 
the Geneva Conventions.”). 
 42.   Greenwood, supra note 14, at 46–47; see Jennifer Elsea, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., RL31367, TREATMENT OF “BATTLEFIELD DETAINEES” IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 
12–13 (2005). 
 43.   Odello, supra note 14, at 23; see Watkin, supra note 16, at 25 (“In respect of 
international armed conflict the determination of when the rules of humanitarian law 
apply is well prescribed by the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I.”). 
 44.  Scope of Application, supra note 33, at 51. 
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parties officially recognize each other as States.45  In addition to the four 
Geneva Conventions, Protocol I Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
(“AP I”)46 applies to international armed conflict.47  It is important to 
note that a formal declaration of war is not required to trigger  the 
application of IHL to international armed conflicts;48 in fact, such formal 
declarations of war are rare in today’s world.49  Thus, analyzing the facts 
surrounding the hostilities determines whether international armed 
conflict exists.50 
3.  Non-International Armed Conflict 
In contrast to an international armed conflict, a non-international armed 
conflict (“NIAC”), or internal armed conflict, either takes place within a 
State’s borders and involves hostilities between that State’s government 
and an armed group, or arises from hostilities between non-State armed 
groups.51  A State’s armed forces must follow the rules of IHL in military 
operations whether an armed conflict is international or non-international.52  
In addition to IHL, international human rights law also governs NIACs.53  
 
 45.  See id. (“The applicability of the rules of international humanitarian law is not 
dependent upon whether the parties to a conflict recognize one another.”). 
 46.  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 
1(3), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I]  (“This Protocol, which supplements 
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the protection of war victims, shall apply 
in the situations referred to in Article 2 common to those Conventions.”). 
 47.  SOLIS, supra note 14, at 150. 
 48.  Scope of Application, supra note 33, at 49; see also SOLIS, supra note 14, at 
150 (“A declaration of war is not required for a common Article 2 international armed 
conflict to exist.”). 
 49.  Scope of Application, supra note 33, at 49 (“In fact, declarations of war have 
become almost unknown since 1945.”). 
 50.  O’Connell, supra note 31, at 854 (“Armed conflict is determined today by 
facts of fighting, not mere declarations as in the period before the adoption of the United 
Nations Charter.”). 
 51.  Fleck, supra note 31, at 605; see also SOLIS, supra note 14, at 152 
(Non-international armed conflicts occur when “there is armed conflict within a state and 
the government’s opponents are not combatants of another state’s armed force.”). 
 52.  Scope of Application, supra note 33, at 55. 
 53.  David Kretzmer, Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial 
Executions or Legitimate Means of Defence?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 171, 202 (2005); see 
also Gardam, supra note 18, at 14 (Human rights norms “can and do supplement IHL, 
particularly during times of non-international armed conflict.”); see also Cordula Droege, 
Elective Affinities? Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, 871 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 
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While human rights law generally applies in peacetime54 and restrains a 
State’s freedom of action with regard to respect for an individual’s 
human rights, such as the rights to life and liberty,55 a State must still 
abide by these standards in times of non-international armed conflict.56  
The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) has recognized this, noting, 
“international human rights law refers to international humanitarian law 
as a lex specialis which informs the content of human rights norms in 
areas to which both are applicable.”57  This means States do not have 
“carte blanche” to behave however they see fit during a NIAC.58 
The application of IHL to NIACs is a departure from the traditional 
stance that NIACs were not subject to the laws of war.59  Prior to World 
War II international law only recognized two types of conflicts: war, 
which was conducted between two States, and civil war, which was 
conducted between a State and an internal group.60  However, there has 
been an increase in frequency of NIACs since the conclusion of World 
War II.61  The 1949 Geneva Conventions updated the laws of war, 
redefining traditional war as international armed conflict and civil war as 
non-international armed conflict.62  The 1977 Additional Protocols to the 
 
501 (2008) (“[T]here is today no question that human rights law comes to complement 
humanitarian law in situations of armed conflict.”). 
 54.  Greenwood, supra note 18, at 12. 
 55.  See e.g., Abresch, supra note 22, at 743; Kretzmer, supra note 53, at 202; 
Emiliano J. Buis, The Implementation of International Humanitarian Law by Human 
Rights Courts: The Example of the Inter-American Human Rights System in INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: TOWARDS A NEW MERGER IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 269, 273 (Roberta Arnold & Noelle Quenivet eds., 2008) (There is 
a set of core “fundamental guarantees, . . .  [that] cannot be suspended or derogated even 
if a situation of emergency has been declared.  These basic rights, which are inherent to 
the dignity of all human beings, constitute a common ground which is shared by HRL 
and IHL.”). 
 56.  Kretzmer, supra note 53, at 202. 
 57.  Scope of Application, supra note 33, at 75; see also Heike Krieger, A Conflict 
of Norms: The Relationship Between Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law in the 
ICRC Customary Law Study, 11 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 265, 270 (2006) (“[H]umanitarian 
law is generally lex specialis in relation to human rights law during times of conflict.”); 
see also Quenivet, supra note 24, at 8 (“Undoubtedly the ICJ declared that although IHL 
was the governing body of law applying in times of armed conflict, HRL continued to 
apply.”). 
 58.  Kretzmer, supra note 53, at 202. 
 59.  GREEN, supra note 26, at 82. 
 60.  EMILY CRAWFORD, THE TREATMENT OF COMBATANTS AND INSURGENTS UNDER 
THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 16–17 (2010). 
 61.  Id. at 14, 23; see also DIANE COYLE & PATRICK MEIER, NEW TECHNOLOGIES IN 
EMERGENCIES & CONFLICTS: THE ROLE OF INFORMATION & SOCIAL NETWORKS 4 (2009) 
(“[A]lthough the number of conflicts between countries has fallen markedly since the 
Cold War, there is a rising level of civil conflict.”). 
 62.   CRAWFORD, supra note 60, at 18–19. 
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Geneva Conventions further refined the laws of armed conflict by 
specifically applying Additional Protocol II (“AP II”) to internal armed 
conflict.63  The jurisprudence of the international courts and ad hoc tribunals 
has solidified the application of IHL to NIACs; for example, the ICJ has 
held that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions contains rules 
that should be applied in situations of non-international armed conflict.64  
The ICTY recognized that IHL applies to both international and non-
international armed conflicts,65 and the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (“ICTR”) recognized the customary status of the application 
of IHL to NIACs.66  The United States applies IHL to NIACs; its official 
policy is to apply IHL to all conflicts, whether international or non-
international.67 
Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and AP II both apply 
specifically to NIACs68 but there are differences between the two 
provisions.69  Common Article 3 “is wider in scope but narrower  in 
content,”70 and sets out only the minimum standards applicable to the 
 
 63.  Id. at 23–26; see GREEN, supra note 26, at 75 (AP II is “[t]he first and only 
international agreement exclusively regulating the conduct of the parties in a non-
international conflict.”). 
 64.  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) 
1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 218 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua] (The rules found in common 
Article 3 “constitute a minimum yardstick, in addition to the more elaborate rules which 
are also to apply to international conflicts; and they are rules which, in the Court’s 
opinion, reflect what the Court in 1949 called ‘elementary considerations of humanity.’”). 
 65.  Tadić Appeals Decision, supra note 37, ¶ 67 (“International humanitarian law 
governs the conduct of both internal and international armed conflicts.”); see GREEN, 
supra note 26, at 82 (“The ad hoc tribunal for Yugoslavia, however, tends to treat both 
international and non-international conflicts as virtually subject to the same law.”). 
 66.  Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 608 (Sept. 
2, 1998), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Akayesu/judgement/akay001.pdf 
(“It is today clear that the norms of Common Article 3 have acquired the status of 
customary law.”). 
 67.  SOLIS, supra note 14, at 167; see also Watkin, supra note 16, at 41 (“One 
approach taken by Canada, the United States and the United Nations has been to apply 
the ‘spirit and principles’ of humanitarian law.”). 
 68.  See SOLIS, supra note 14, at 153 (“In a non-international armed conflict, 
common Article 3, and, perhaps, Additional Protocol II, apply.  No other portion of the 
Geneva Conventions applies.”); see also Scope of Application, supra note 33, at 55 
(Common Article 3 “applies to any ‘armed conflict not of an international character[.]’”). 
 69.  Kretzmer, supra note 53, at 176 n.25. 
 70.  PROVOST, supra note 30, at 261. 
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conflict.71  It applies to any NIAC that occurs on the territory of a State 
that has ratified the Geneva Conventions.72  On the other hand, AP II is 
“of more limited applicability but contain[s] detailed rules,”73 and only 
applies to conflicts between a State’s armed forces and dissident armed 
forces, or between non-State organized armed groups engaged in protracted 
military operations.74  For AP II to apply, the non-State party involved in 
the conflict must have some control over the territory.75 
A minimum threshold of intensity and organization must be met to 
distinguish armed conflict from internal disturbances and riots.76  Common 
Article 3 does not provide any indication of this required degree of 
intensity.77  However, AP II specifies that it does “not apply to situations 
of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic 
acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed 
conflicts.”78  Thus, the AP II threshold for non-international armed conflict 
is higher than the threshold found in Common Article 3.79  As a result, 
AP II “supplements” Common Article 3 in that it provides criteria to 
assist in distinguishing between situations of armed conflict and situations 
not rising to that level;80 if AP II applies to a conflict, Common Article 3 
will also apply.81 
 
 71.  ICRC Study, supra note 24, at 178; see also Robert J. Delahunty & John C. 
Yoo, What is the Role of International Human Rights Law in the War on Terror?, 59 
DEPAUL L. REV. 803, 833 (2010) (“Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions is also 
a conventional [law of armed conflict] that applies to ‘internal’ armed conflicts, but it too 
has very limited substantive implications.”). 
 72.  Scope of Application, supra note 33, at 55. 
 73.  PROVOST, supra note 30, at 261. 
 74.  Scope of Application, supra note 33, at 55. 
 75.  Kretzmer, supra note 53, at 176 n. 25. 
 76.  CRYER, supra note 34, at 279. 
 77.  ANTHONY CULLEN, THE CONCEPT OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 
IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 132 (2010). 
 78.  Scope of Application, supra note 33, at 55. 
 79.  See e.g., GREEN, supra note 26, at 83 (This threshold is so high “that it would 
exclude most revolutions and rebellions, and would probably not operate in a civil war 
until the rebels were well established and had set up some form of de facto government.”); 
PROVOST, supra note 30, at 261 (“The second paragraph [of AP II, Article 1] marks the 
lower threshold beneath which the Protocol does not apply.”); Maria-Daniella Marouda, 
Application of International Humanitarian Law in contemporary armed conflicts: is it 
‘simply’ a question of facts?, in ARMED CONFLICTS & INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW 201, 210 (Stelios Perrakis & Maria-Daniella Marouda eds., 2009) (“Additional 
Protocol II requires an even higher degree of organization, since the parties would have 
to be able to carry out . . . sustained and concerted military operations[.]”). 
 80.  ICRC Study, supra note 24, at 178; see Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 71, at 
833 (“Additional Protocol II is the most developed body of treaty law relating to 
conflicts of this nature, but it covers only a small segment of internal conflicts, and its 
substantive provisions are few.”); see also HECTOR OLASOLO, UNLAWFUL ATTACKS IN 
COMBAT OPERATIONS 33 (2008) (“AP II elaborates on the rules contained in common art. 
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To qualify as an armed conflict, the hostilities between organized groups 
must last for some period of time and involve a certain level of force.82  
Under the ICTY’s Tadić standard, armed conflict exists when there is 
protracted violence between a State and an organized armed group,83 or 
between armed groups within the territory of a State.84  Although this 
definition is still “broader in scope than that considered by the drafters of 
the Geneva Conventions, it is arguably now the most authoritative 
formulation of the threshold associated with common Article 3.”85  The 
Tadić Trial Chamber noted that analyses of these elements is necessary 
to distinguish situations of armed conflict from situations which do not 
trigger the application of IHL, such as situations of banditry, unorganized or 
short-term skirmishes, or terrorist activities.86  Therefore, the determination 
of whether a situation rises to the level of an armed conflict must be 
 
3 for non-international armed conflicts and provides for a set of criteria to distinguish 
between situations of armed conflict and situations of internal disturbances and tensions.”). 
 81.  PROVOST, supra note 30, at 261; INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC), 
COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS 
OF 12 AUGUST 1949 1350 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter ICRC COMMENTARY] 
(“[I]n circumstances where the conditions of application of the Protocol are met, the 
Protocol and common Article 3 will apply simultaneously, as the Protocol’s field of 
application is included in the broader one of common Article 3.”). 
 82.  O’Connell, supra note 33, at 855–56.  Note this is different from common 
Article 2 international conflicts, where “[a] state of international armed conflict can be 
said to exist in the absence of hostilities in cases of military occupation.” CULLEN, supra 
note 77, at 131. 
 83.  See Kretzmer, supra note 53, at 197–98 (“While Common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions does not state so expressly, it is agreed that in order for a non-
international conflict covered by this article to exist, there must also be an organized 
group.”). 
 84.  Tadić Appeals Decision, supra note 37, ¶ 70. 
 85.  CULLEN, supra note 77, at 122. 
 86.  Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber Opinion and Judgment, 
¶ 562 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997), http://www.icty. 
org/x/cases/tadic/tjug/en/tad-tsj70507JT2-e.pdf [hereinafter Tadić Trial Judgment]; see 
also Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Trial Chamber Decision on Motion 
for Judgment of Acquittal, ¶ 26 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 16, 
2004), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/tdec/en/040616.htm (“The main 
purpose of the Tadić test is to distinguish an armed conflict from banditry, unorganized 
and short-lived insurrections, or terrorist activities, all of which are not subject to 
international law.”); O’Connell, supra note 31, at 856 (“One-way attacks and minor 
armed exchanges are not armed conflicts.”). 
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decided on a case-by-case basis,87 guided by the intensity of the conflict 
and the organization of the parties to that conflict.88 
a.  Intensity of the Conflict 
The intensity of the conflict need not be analyzed if there has been a 
formal declaration of war.89  Recall, however, that formal declarations of 
war do not presently occur as frequently as they did in the past.  When 
do acts of violence reach the level of intensity required to establish an 
armed conflict?  Principally, the level of intensity must exceed the level 
found in internal disturbances and tensions.90  This is to differentiate 
armed conflict from isolated incidents or sporadic acts of violence.  
However, the threshold must allow for the inclusion of “situations of 
internal conflict where hostilities are not necessarily carried out on a 
continuous basis.”91  Thus, the intensity requirement includes a temporal 
element, which IHL provides from the instant an armed conflict 
begins.92  Because armed conflict requires an actual exchange between 
the parties,93 it will not begin with the attack, but with the counter-attack 
or response of force from the attacked party.94 
 
 87.  Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 92 (Dec. 
6, 1999), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Rutaganda/judgement/991206.pdf 
(“It can thence be seen that the definition of an armed conflict per se is termed in the 
abstract, and whether or not a situation can be described as an “armed conflict,” meeting 
the criteria of Common Article 3, is to be decided upon on a case-by-case basis.”); see 
also Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 55/97, 
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 153 (1997) (“When faced with making such a 
determination, what is required in the final analysis is a good faith and objective analysis 
of the facts in each particular case.”). 
 88.  CULLEN, supra note 77, at 122 (“[T]he Tadić Trial Chamber interpreted the 
definition expounded in the Jurisdiction Decision as a ‘test’ for the existence of armed 
conflict and hence also for applicability of common Article 3.  The definition ‘focuses on 
two aspects of a conflict; the intensity of the conflict and the organization of the parties 
to the conflict.”); see also Milošević, supra note 86, ¶ 17. 
 89.  CULLEN, supra note 77, at 132 (“As a declaration of war in itself is sufficient 
to bring into force the Geneva Conventions, it is clear that the requirement of intensity 
need not be relevant to determining the status of an armed conflict initiated in this 
way.”); see also OLASOLO, supra note 80, at 51 (“[T]he starting date of the conflict 
coincides with the initial use of armed violence by one of the parties to the conflict, 
regardless of the issue of a declaration of war.”). 
 90.  CULLEN, supra note 77, at 127. 
 91.  Id. at 128. 
 92.  ARNOLD, supra note 30, at 93; see also Tadić Appeals Decision, supra note 
37, ¶ 67 (“[T]he temporal and geographical scope of both internal and international 
armed conflicts extends beyond the exact time and place of hostilities.”). 
 93.  O’Connell, supra note 31, at 855–56 (Armed conflict requires hostilities, 
which “are the actual engagement in fighting.”). 
 94.   Id. at 855. 
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The gamut of this temporal element is important because the Geneva 
Conventions apply beyond the cessation of hostilities.95  IHL’s temporal 
scope extends beyond the conclusion of the armed conflict for the purpose 
of ensuring POWs and any civilians detained during the hostilities are 
released and repatriated.96  The temporal scope also assists with the 
analysis of the existence of an armed conflict; the longer the hostilities 
continue, the more likely the incident has become an armed conflict.97 
Relevant factors in the analysis of the intensity element include the 
length of the conflict, the protracted nature of the conflict, the seriousness of 
armed clashes, the spread of clashes throughout the territory, and the 
type of arms used by the parties.98  Additional factors to consider are the 
high number of casualties,99 and the involvement of the UN Security 
 
 95.  Tadić Appeals Decision, supra note 37, ¶ 67. 
 96.  OLASOLO, supra note 80, at 51; see also Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-
04-16-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 245 (June 20, 2007), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?file 
ticket=0LA5W/dbDMQ=&tabid=106 (“International humanitarian law applies from the 
initiation of such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a 
general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of internal conflicts, until a 
peaceful settlement is achieved.”) [hereinafter AFRC Case]. 
 97.   SOLIS, supra note 14, at 152 (“A key indicia [of armed conflict] is whether 
the incident is protracted.  The longer an incident continues, the more difficult it is to 
describe it as merely an incident.”). 
 98.   CULLEN, supra note 77, at 128–29, referencing Milošević, supra note 86, 
¶¶ 28–31.  A comprehensive list of factors can be found in Prosecutor v. Boškoski, Case 
No. IT-04-82-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 177 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 
10, 2008), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/boskoski_tarculovski/acjug/en/100519_ajudg.pdf 
(“These include the seriousness of attacks and whether there has been an increase in armed 
clashes, the spread of clashes over territory and over a period of time, any increase in the 
number of government forces and mobilisation and the distribution of weapons among 
both parties to the conflict, as well as whether the conflict has attracted the attention of 
the United Nations Security Council, and whether any resolutions on the matter have 
been passed.  Trial Chambers have also taken into account in this respect the number of 
civilians forced to flee from the combat zones; the type of weapons used, in particular 
the use of heavy weapons, and other military equipment, such as tanks and other heavy 
vehicles; the blocking or besieging of towns and the heavy shelling of these towns; the 
extent of destruction and the number of casualties caused by shelling or fighting; the 
quantity of troops and units deployed; existence and change of front lines between the 
parties; the occupation of territory, and towns and villages; the deployment of government 
forces to the crisis area; the closure of roads; cease fire orders and agreements, and the 
attempt of representatives from international organisations to broker and enforce cease 
fire agreements.”). 
 99.  Boškoski, supra note 98, ¶ 183 (“The high number of casualties and extent of 
material destruction have also been important elements in their deciding whether an 
armed conflict existed.”). 
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Council and whether it has passed any resolutions regarding the 
hostilities.100  The ICTY referenced these criteria in its denial of Slobodan 
Milošević’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal,101 where he argued there 
was no armed conflict in Kosovo.102  The Trial Chamber noted the purpose 
of the intensity requirement from the Tadić test “is to distinguish an armed 
conflict from banditry, unorganized and short-lived insurrections, or 
terrorist activities, all of which are not subject to international law.”103  In 
concluding there was sufficient evidence of an armed conflict in Kosovo,104 
the Trial Chamber considered the following: the Kosovo Liberation Army 
(“KLA”)105 carried out numerous operations against the police and Albanian 
villages (evidence of the protracted nature of the conflict); the 
severe conflicts throughout the region (the spread of clashes over the 
territory); the offensive by Serb policemen, soldiers, and paramilitaries into 
villages where the KLA was not active (the increase of governmental 
forces sent to Kosovo); and the KLA’s use of rifles, guns, and mortars 
(the use of weapons by both parties).106  Likewise, in Limaj, et al.,107 the 
ICTY considered the seriousness of the hostilities, the mobilization of 
the troops by the government, the types of arms utilized by the parties, 
the destruction of property, the displacement of local population, and the 
number of casualties.108 
 
 100.  Marouda, supra note 79, at 221; see also Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. 
ICC-01/04-01/06, Trial Judgment, ¶ 538 (Mar. 14, 2012) [hereinafter Lubanga Trial 
Judgment] (“In order to assess the intensity of a potential conflict, the ICTY has 
indicated a Chamber should take into account . . . whether the conflict has attracted the 
attention of the United Nations Security Council, and, if so, whether any resolutions on 
the matter have been passed.”); Boškoski, supra note 98, ¶ 177. 
 101.  The indictment against Milošević, the former president of Serbia, alleged he 
participated in a joint criminal enterprise to expel the Kosovo Albanian population from 
Kosovo by shelling towns and villages, and burning Kosovo homes, among other 
criminal activities. 
 102.  See Milošević, supra note 86, ¶ 14 (“[I]n order for the Trial Chamber to have 
jurisdiction over crimes pursuant to Articles 3 and 5 of the Statute, the crimes must have 
been committed in an armed conflict.”). 
 103.  Id. ¶ 26. 
 104.  Id. ¶ 40. 
 105.  The KLA was an Albanian paramilitary organization that sought to separate 
Kosovo from Yugoslavia. 
 106.  Id. ¶¶ 26–32. 
 107.  This was a case against three KLA members, alleging their participation in a 
joint criminal enterprise to intimidate, imprison, and murder Serb civilians and perceived 
Albanian supporters who refused to cooperate with the KLA. 
 108.  CULLEN, supra note 77, at 129 (referencing Prosecutor v. Limaj et al., Case 
No. IT-03-66-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 135–43, 150, 166–67 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/limaj/tjug/en/lim-tj05 
1130-e.pdf. 
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The ICTR and the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) also analyze 
the intensity of the conflict when determining the existence of a non-
international armed conflict.109  The ICTR has noted that international 
and non-international armed conflicts are distinguishable based upon the 
intensity of the conflict itself.110  Similarly, in Lubanga, the ICC’s first 
judgment, the Trial Chamber referenced the ICTY’s decision in Mrkšić111 
and noted the following criteria may be indicative of an armed conflict: 
“the seriousness of attacks and potential increase in armed clashes, their 
spread over territory and over a period of time, the increase in the number of 
government forces, the mobilisation and the distribution of weapons 
among both parties to the conflict.”112 
b.  Organization of the Parties 
Although the Tadić decision did not provide a definition for “organized 
armed group,”113 subsequent case law has developed the term.  The 
ICTY has reasoned that an armed conflict requires some degree of 
organization by the parties.114  The Milošević Decision on the Motion for 
Judgment of Acquittal set out criteria that can be used to find this degree 
of organization, including whether a party to the conflict had headquarters, 
specific geographic areas of operation, and the ability to obtain weapons 
and distribute them to its members.115  The Trial Chamber found the KLA 
was an organized military group with headquarters, a joint command 
 
 109.  See Lubanga Trial Judgment, supra note 100, ¶ 538. 
 110.  Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 602 (Sept. 
2, 1998), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Akayesu/judgement/akay001.pdf 
(“The distinction pertaining to situations of conflicts of a non-international character 
emanates from the differing intensity of the conflicts.  Such distinction is inherent to the 
conditions of applicability specified for Common Article 3 or Additional Protocol II 
respectively.”). 
 111.  See Prosecutor v. Mrkšić, Case No. IT-95-13/1-T, Trial Judgment (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 27, 2007), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mrksic/tjug/ 
en/070927.pdf. 
 112.  Lubanga Trial Judgment, supra note 100, ¶ 538 (citing Mrkšić, supra note 
111, ¶ 407). 
 113.  CULLEN, supra note 77, at 124. 
 114.  Limaj et al., supra note 108, ¶ 89 (“[S]ome degree of organisation by the 
parties will suffice to establish the existence of an armed conflict.”). 
 115.  Id. ¶ 90 (“With respect to the organisation of the parties to the conflict 
Chambers of the Tribunal have taken into account factors including the existence of 
headquarters, designated zones of operation, and the ability to procure, transport, and 
distribute arms.”) 
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structure, and designated zones of operation,116 thus meeting the first 
element of the Tadić test.117   
International jurisprudence has followed this analysis. The Inter -
American Commission on Human Rights (“IACHR”) has recognized 
that armed conflict requires the existence of organized armed groups 
capable of engaging in military activities against one another.118  In the 
La Tablada case, the IACHR considered whether the level of organization 
of a group of attackers on a Buenos Aires military barracks was enough 
to constitute an armed conflict.119  The IACHR noted the group was 
organized enough to successfully plan and execute a military operation 
against a military objective, and thus, met the requirement for an organized 
armed group.120  Likewise, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”) 
has noted the degree of organization must be such that the armed group 
is able to organize and carry out concerted military operations and have 
the ability to impose a disciplinary system upon the group.121 
Similarly, in its Decision on the Application for a Warrant of Arrest in 
the Bemba case, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber found reasonable grounds to 
support the existence of an armed conflict, due to the level of organization 
of the two groups engaged in conflict.122  In that case, it was alleged 
there was an armed conflict in the Central African Republic (“CAR”) 
between the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (“MLC”), a 
rebel group from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”) led by 
Bemba, and a rebel group composed of former members of the Central 
African Armed Forces (“FACA”), who were attempting to overthrow the 
CAR president.  The Pre-Trial Chamber considered that both groups had 
a hierarchical organizational structure, which allowed them to operate 
under an organized chain-of-command with disciplinary powers.123  Bemba 
possessed both political leadership and military command over the 
MLC.124  Furthermore, the MLC was organized just like a State’s armed 
 
 116.  Milošević, supra note 86, ¶ 23.  See also Limaj et al., supra note 108, ¶ 172 
(“The ability of the KLA to engage in such varied operations is a further indicator of its 
level of organization.” These operations included simultaneous engagement with armed 
forces at Kosovo’s northern, eastern, southern, and western borders.). 
 117.  Milošević, supra note 86, ¶ 25. 
 118.  Abella, supra note 87, ¶ 152. 
 119.  Id. ¶ 155-56. 
 120.  Id. ¶ 155. 
 121.  AFRC Case, supra note 96, ¶ 738. 
 122.  Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision on 
the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest, ¶ 54 (June 10, 2008). 
 123.  Id. (“[B]oth groups had a hierarchical structure enabling them to act under 
responsible command with operational and disciplinary powers and a sufficient level of 
internal organisation.”). 
 124.   Id. 
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forces, with brigades, battalions, companies, and platoons, and the ability to 
organize military operations.125  Thus, the Pre-Trial Chamber was 
persuaded that there was an armed conflict between the two organized 
groups.  More recently, the Lubanga Trial Chamber noted that the term 
“organized armed group” means that the parties to a conflict must be 
sufficiently organized in a way to enable them to carry out protracted armed 
violence.126  According to the ICC, relevant factors to be considered in 
determining the organization of the parties include: “the force or group’s 
internal hierarchy; the command structure and rules; the extent to which 
military equipment, including firearms, are available; the force or group’s 
ability to plan military operations and put them into effect; and the extent, 
seriousness, and intensity of any military involvement.”127 
4.  Internationalized Armed Conflict 
It is possible to have an international armed conflict and a 
non-international armed conflict take place simultaneously in a single 
territory.128  It is also possible for situations of armed conflict that began 
as a non-international armed conflict within the boundaries of a State to 
become “internationalized.”129  An internationalized armed conflict could 
arise if a State conducts military operations against a transnational group 
in the territory of a foreign State without the agreement of that State.130  
 
 125.   Id. (The other rebel group “was also organised hierarchically and had the 
ability to plan and execute military operations.”). 
 126.   Lubanga Trial Judgment, supra note 100, ¶ 536. 
 127.   Id. ¶ 537. 
 128.   Id. ¶ 541; see SOLIS, supra note 14, at 156 (“A mixed category of armed 
conflict, what might be called a dual status conflict, is one in which both international 
and internal conflicts are occurring at the same time within the same state.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 129.   E.g., Marouda, supra note 79, at 214; Fleck, supra note 31, at 606 (“Certain 
armed conflicts may be considered as internationalised, even if not all parties to the 
conflict are sovereign states.”); CRAWFORD, supra note 60, at 15 (An internationalized 
armed conflict is an “armed conflict that starts as an internal armed conflict, but, due to 
any number of contributing factors, becomes transformed into an international armed 
conflict.”); Lubanga Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra note 41, ¶ 209 (An 
internal armed conflict can become an international armed conflict “if (i) another State 
intervenes in that conflict through its troops (direct intervention), or if (ii) some of the 
participants in the internal armed conflict act on behalf of that other State (indirect 
intervention).”). 
 130.  Fleck, supra note 31, at 607; ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 420 (2d 
ed. 2005) (“An armed conflict which takes place between an Occupying Power and rebel 
CLINE (DO NOT DELETE, OR ADD TEXT IN THIS AREA) 10/19/2016  5:20 PM 
 
72 
Or, internationalization might occur if a third State directly intervenes on 
behalf of one of the parties to the conflict.131  Internationalization is also 
possible through indirect involvement of a third State that “effectively 
controls” one of the parties involved in the non-international armed 
conflict.132  However, if a State enters into an armed conflict with an 
armed group that is not acting on behalf of a government, then that 
conflict will not become internationalized.133 
Thus, it is important to analyze when an armed group’s actions are 
attributable to a State.  The ICJ established the “effective control test” in 
Nicaragua to guide this analysis, which states that in order to impute 
acts of an armed group to a State, the relationship must be one of 
dependence on one side (the armed group) and control on the other (the 
State).134  The issue before the ICJ in Nicaragua was whether American 
involvement with the contras, a counter-revolutionary group in Nicaragua, 
made the United States responsible for the contras’ acts.  The United 
States claimed it was intervening on behalf of its allies El Salvador, 
Honduras, and Costa Rica, who were under attack by the government of 
Nicaragua.135  The United States provided logistical support, information 
on the location and movements of troops, and radar coverage to the 
contras; furthermore, the contras’ paramilitary operations were planned 
in close collaboration with, if not completely by, American advisers.136  
Despite this level of involvement, the ICJ found that while the United 
States’ assistance to the contras was crucial to the contras’ activities, the 
contras’ actions were not attributable to the United States.137  The ICJ 
stated the United States did not have “effective control” over the contras’ 
military or paramilitary operations.138  This finding was surprising in light 
of how much the United States collaborated with the contras; the ICJ 
noted the level of involvement needed to be that of directing or enforcing 
 
or insurgent groups—whether or not they are terrorist in character—in an occupied 
territory, amounts to an international armed conflict.”). 
 131.  Marouda, supra note 79, at 214. 
 132.  Lubanga Trial Judgment, supra note 100, ¶ 541 (“It is widely accepted that 
when a State enters into conflict with a nongovernmental armed group located in the 
territory of a neighbouring State and the armed group is acting under the control of its 
own State, ‘the fighting falls within the definition of an international armed conflict.’”). 
 133.  Id. (“[I]f the armed group is not acting on behalf of a government, in the 
absence of two States opposing each other, there is no international armed conflict.”). 
 134.  See Nicaragua, supra note 64, ¶ 109. 
 135.  GREGOR WETTBERG, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGALITY OF SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST 
NON-STATE ACTORS 35 (2007); see also Nicaragua, supra note 64, ¶ 165. 
 136.  Nicaragua, supra note 64, ¶ 106. 
 137.  Id. ¶ 110. 
 138.  Id. ¶ 115. 
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the perpetration of the acts contrary to the law.139  Although the United 
States assisted with the financing, organizing, training, supplying, and 
equipping of the contras and assisted with the planning of their 
operations,140 its participation was not enough. 
Almost ten years after the Nicaragua decision, the ICTY rejected the 
effective control test and developed a new test with a lower threshold of 
control.141  In its Tadić decision, the ICTY found that to impute the actions 
of a non-State group to a State, that group must be under the “overall 
control” of the State.142  Financial and military assistance from a State is 
not enough;143 the controlling State must also coordinate the armed group or 
assist with the general planning of its military activities.144  Thus, the 
threshold for the overall control test is when a State plays a part in 
organizing, coordinating, or planning the military actions of the group 
in addition to the funding, supplying, and training of that group.145  
However, the ICTY noted that if the controlling State is not the location 
of the hostilities, “more extensive and compelling evidence is required to 
show that the State is genuinely in control of the units or groups not 
merely by financing and equipping them, but also by generally directing 
or helping plan their actions.”146  Furthermore, the test for determining 
whether acts of individuals or non-military groups may be imputed to a 
State is whether specific instructions were given for the commission of a 
particular act, or if there was public approval of the acts after their 
commission.147 
The consequence of using the overall control test to determine 
whether an armed group’s actions are attributable to a State could be an 
increase in situations that cross the threshold into armed conflict.  When 
States intervene on behalf of their allies, like the United States did in 
 
 139.   Id. 
 140.   Id. 
 141.  WETTBERG, supra note 135, at 37; Tadić Trial Judgment, supra note 86, ¶ 585 
(“The [ICJ] set a particularly high threshold test for determining the requisite degree of 
control.”). 
 142.   Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 120 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/ 
acjug/en/tad-aj990715e.pdf [hereinafter Tadić Appeals Judgment]. 
 143.   Id. ¶ 130. 
 144.   Id. ¶ 131. 
 145.   See id. ¶ 137. 
 146.   Id. ¶ 138. 
 147.   Id. ¶ 132. 
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Nicaragua, there is a greater chance that using the overall control test to 
analyze such intervention will internationalize the conflict.  The United 
States organized, trained, supplied and equipped the contras, and assisted 
with planning operations; all of these are actions that fulfill the overall 
control test.148  Thus, an analysis of the United States’ actions in Nicaragua 
following the ICTY’s perspective would likely lead to American 
responsibility for the contras’ acts. 
In summary, an international armed conflict has occurred if two States 
are engaged in hostilities with one another, regardless of whether they 
recognize each other as States.  A non-international armed conflict arises 
when protracted armed violence occurs between a State and an organized 
group.  IHL applies to both situations, but not to hostilities falling below 
the armed conflict threshold.  Thus, the distinction between whether a 
conflict is international or non-international is essential because the armed 
conflict label dictates which IHL standards and protections apply.   
Furthermore, the legal consequences of an individual’s involvement in 
the hostilities also depend upon this classification.  The following section 
will introduce each category of actor in an armed conflict,  and the 
consequences of each label. 
III.  LEGAL STATUS OF THE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL        
HUMANITARIAN LAW 
The legal status of the actors in armed conflict is important for many 
reasons.  First, an individual’s legal status determines what actions that 
individual may lawfully take during the armed conflict, and dictates 
what treatment he or she is entitled to receive upon falling into enemy 
hands.149  Second, it assists in defining the State’s duty toward the actors 
in armed conflict, both during and after the conclusion of hostilities.  
Finally, an individual’s legal status is important as it could mean the 
difference between being either lawfully targeted by the enemy, or protected 
from such targeting. 
A.  Combatant Status 
International humanitarian law recognizes two categories of actors 
engaged in international armed conflict: combatants and noncombatants.150  
These two groups compose the armed forces of the parties involved in 
 
 148.  See Nicaragua, supra note 64, ¶¶ 106, 115. 
 149.  See SOLIS, supra note 14, at 238. 
 150.  See O’Connell, supra note 31, at 853 (“[N]o one is a combatant in the absence 
of armed conflict.”). 
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armed conflicts.151  The travaux preparatoires of the Additional Protocols 
to the Geneva Conventions clarifies that “armed forces” means “all the 
armed forces—including those which under some national systems might 
not be called regular forces, but does not include ‘other governmental 
agencies the members of which may be armed’ such as law-enforcement 
bodies and paramilitary agencies.”152  Generally, domestic law will define 
membership in the armed forces.153  Combatants are legally entitled to 
take part in the hostilities on behalf of their State or an armed group 
permitted to engage in hostilities.154  Thus, the test for whether an individual 
is a lawful combatant is whether he or she is a member of the armed 
forces of a State or group involved in an international armed conflict.155  
Because combatants have the legal right to participate in the ongoing 
hostilities,156 they give up their right to not be attacked.157  Put another 
way, combatants exchange their right to life for the right to kill.158  
 
 151.  Knut Ipsen, Combatants and Non-Combatants in THE HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 79, 80–81 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2d ed. 2008) (“[M]embers 
of armed forces as a rule are combatants and [] the non-combatant status of members of 
the armed forces applies in exceptional cases.”); see Annex to Hague Convention (IV) 
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 3., Oct. 18, 1907, 187 Consol. 
T.S. 227 [hereinafter Hague Convention] (“The armed forces of the belligerent parties 
may consist of combatants and non-combatants.”). 
 152.  Luisa Vierucci, Private Military and Security Companies in Non-international 
Armed Conflicts: Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello Issues, in WAR BY CONTRACT 235, 248–
49 (Francesco Francioni & Natalino Ronzitti eds., 2011). 
 153.  Kenneth Watkin, Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups and the ICRC 
“Direct Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive Guidance, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 
641, 654 (2010) [hereinafter Opportunity Lost]. 
 154.  An armed group is usually authorized to participate in the hostilities by a 
sovereign State.  See Eric Talbot Jensen, Direct Participation in Hostilities: A Concept 
Broad Enough for Today’s Targeting Decisions, in NEW BATTLEFIELDS, OLD LAWS: 
CRITICAL DEBATES ON ASYMMETRIC WARFARE 88 (2011). 
 155.  See JORDAN J. PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S 
UNLAWFUL RESPONSES IN THE “WAR” ON TERROR 51 (2007); see also Israel Case, supra 
note 19, para. 24. 
 156.  Abresch, supra note 22, at 757; see Watkin, supra note 16, at 35 (“Combatants 
have a right to take part in hostilities regardless of the ‘justness’ of the cause.”). 
 157.  Abresch, supra note 22, at 741; see IAN HENDERSON, CONTEMPORARY LAW OF 
TARGETING: MILITARY OBJECTIVES, PROPORTIONALITY, AND PRECAUTIONS IN ATTACK 
UNDER ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I 80 (2009) (“As one would expect, it is lawful to target 
combatants.”). 
 158.  Abresch, supra note 22, at 741. 
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Furthermore, combatants may lawfully shoot and be shot at by the 
enemy.159 
Lawful combatants are entitled to “combatant immunity,” a term 
which states that they will not be punished for their lawful participation 
in the armed conflict.160  Combatant immunity also means lawful 
combatants must receive prisoner of war (“POW”) status upon capture 
by the enemy.161  Combatants are sometimes referred to as “privileged 
belligerents” as a reflection of this immunity and its resulting privileges.162  
However, combatant immunity will not apply if the combatant violates 
the laws of war in some way.163 
Combatants are considered valid military objectives, and thus may be 
targeted and attacked at any time during the armed conflict, until such 
time when they surrender.164  Combatants may be attacked when they 
are not actually threatening the enemy, such as when they are sleeping or 
far from the front lines of the combat zone.165  This reflects the idea that 
it is the individual’s status, as opposed to his or her actions, that determines 
whether he or she may lawfully be targeted and killed; a combatant is a 
legitimate target regardless of whether that individual actually endangered 
the life of the enemy.166  Taken to the extreme, this means an enemy 
could potentially target and kill a combatant who is at home on leave.167  
Thus, “[c]ombatants may be targeted wherever found, armed or unarmed, 
 
 159.  HENDERSON, supra note 157, at 81. 
 160.  See Abresch, supra note 22, at 757 (“[T]his means that if he is captured a 
combatant may not be prosecuted as a murderer for killing enemy combatants; instead, 
he becomes a prisoner of war, held only until the end of active hostilities.”); see also 
Arnold, supra note 30, at 92 (“[C]ombatants are immune from prosecution for having 
directly participated in hostilities, since this is their task.”); see also CRAWFORD, supra 
note 60, at 52 (2010) (“[C]ombatants who fulfill the necessary requirements to be so 
classified are legitimately permitted to participate in armed hostilities.”). 
 161.  Jensen, supra note 154, at 88. 
 162.  See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 155, at 51 (Referring to combatants as “privileged” 
or “lawful” belligerents.) 
 163.  See PAUST, supra note 155, at 53 (“Violations of the laws of war are war 
crimes; violators are not entitled to immunity and are thus prosecutable.”); Watkin, supra 
note 16, at 35 (“[L]awful combatants are immune from prosecution.”); CRAWFORD, supra 
note 60, at 53 (“At the cessation of hostilities, a legitimate combatant will not face 
prosecution for acts committed during the course of the armed conflict, unless such acts 
were in violation of the laws of armed conflict.”). 
 164.  SOLIS, supra note 14, at 188; see Marco Sassoli & Laura M. Olson, The 
Relationship Between International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law Where it 
Matters: Admissible Killing and Internment of Fighters in Non-international Armed 
Conflicts, 871 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 599, 605–06 (2008). 
 165.  SOLIS, supra note 14, at 188; Sassoli & Olson, supra note 164, at 606. 
 166.  Kretzmer, supra note 53, at 190–91. 
 167.  SOLIS, supra note 14, at 188. 
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on a front line or a mile or a hundred miles behind the lines.”168  However, 
they can withdraw from the armed conflict by becoming “hors de combat,” 
meaning the combatant laid down his or her arms and surrendered to the 
enemy, or became sick, wounded, or shipwrecked.169  If a combatant 
becomes hors de combat and falls into the hands of his or her enemy, 
that combatant is entitled to POW status and all of its attendant privileges.170 
Article 13 of the First and Second Geneva Conventions, Article 4 of 
the Third Geneva Convention, and Article 43 of AP I list the criteria 
used to determine whether a person is a combatant.   The elements 
determinative of this status include, subordination to a responsible  
commander, the display of a fixed and distinctive emblem, the open 
carrying of arms, and conducting operations in accordance with jus in 
bello.171  However, if a combatant fails to meet one of these elements, he 
would not then become an “unlawful combatant;” he would retain his 
combatant status, but lose his POW protections,172 and could receive 
punishment for his unlawful conduct.173 
In non-international armed conflict, the combatant label is not used;174 
the combatant category is reserved specifically for designated persons 
participating in international armed conflict.175  As a result, individuals 
 
 168.  Id. at 190. 
 169.  Id. at 188–89. 
 170.  Id. at 189.  See also Eric Christensen, The Dilemma of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities, 19 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 281, 287 (2010). 
 171.  See Israel Case, supra note 19, para. 24; see also Michael N. Schmitt, 
Asymmetrical Warfare and International Humanitarian Law , in INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW FACING NEW CHALLENGES 11, 25 (Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg 
& Volker Epping eds., 2007). 
 172.  Schmitt, supra note 171, at 25. 
 173.  Jensen, supra note 154, at 89. 
 174.  Guido den Dekker & Eric PJ Myjer, The Right to Life and Self-defence of 
Private Military and Security Contractors in Armed Conflict, in WAR BY CONTRACT 171, 
176 (Francesco Francioni & Natalino Ronzitti eds., 2011) (“The special status of 
‘combatant’ is not extended to non-State participants in internal conflicts.”); see also 
SOLIS, supra note 14, at 191 (“The traditional view is that . . . in non-international armed 
conflicts, there are no ‘combatants,’ lawful or otherwise.”); see also Abresch, supra note 
22, at 758 (“In the humanitarian law of internal armed conflicts, the distinction is 
between ‘civilians’ and persons who are ‘taking a direct part in hostilities.’”). 
 175.   CRAWFORD, supra note 60, at 68 (Unlawful combatants “do not fulfill the 
requirements of combatancy since that category only exists for specific persons in 
international armed conflict.”); see also SOLIS, supra note 14, at 191 (“[I]n terms of [the 
law of internal armed conflict] there are fighters, rebels, insurgents, or guerillas who 
engage in armed conflict, and there are government forces . . .  [t]here are no combatants 
as that term is used in customary law of war.”). 
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who directly participate in NIACs are not entitled to combatant immunity or 
protection as a POW,176 and may be “subject to the domestic laws of the 
State in which they are captured and liable for their criminal acts.”177  
During non-international armed conflicts, State parties to the conflict 
may only legally target and attack civilians who directly participate in 
hostilities.178 
1.  Members of Organized Armed Groups 
Organized armed groups conduct hostilities on behalf of a non-State 
party to an armed conflict.179  Essentially, they are the armed forces of 
that non-State party.180 These organized armed groups may include 
dissident armed forces or other organized groups that are identifiable 
through their armed activities.181  Members of these organized armed 
groups are not combatants, and therefore they do not receive the benefits 
and privileges conferred upon combatants.182  But, they are also not 
civilians and do not receive protection from attack.183  Thus, members of 
armed groups often operate outside the scope of combatant status.184  
Status as a member of an organized armed group is based on “continuous 
combat function” (“CCF”).185  This means “individuals whose continuous 
function involves the preparation, execution, or command of acts or 
 
 176.   Watkin, supra note 16, at 35; see also CRAWFORD, supra note 60, at 48 (“[A] 
lawful combatant can expect certain rights and privileges to be respected by his or her 
captor.  However, there is no equivalent status for participants in a non-international 
armed conflict.”); cf. Fleck, supra note 31, at 627 (“In non-international armed conflicts 
fighters cannot claim treatment as prisoners of war upon detention.”). 
 177.   CRAWFORD, supra note 60, at 68; Watkin, supra note 16, at 36 (“[N]on-State 
actors have no immunity from prosecution regardless of whether they have complied 
with humanitarian law.”). 
 178.   Targeted Killings Study, supra note 16, ¶ 58; Vasuki Sunkavalli, Targeted 
Killing as a Counter Terrorism Tactic: Should We Name It or Shame It?, 18 U. MIAMI 
INT’L COMP. L. REV. 137, 154 (2011) (“[T]he distinction between combatants and civilians 
applies in both international armed conflict as well as non-international armed conflict.”). 
 179.   NILS MELZER, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION 
IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 70 (2009); see also SOLIS, 
supra note 14, at 205. 
 180.   SOLIS, supra note 14, at 205. 
 181.   MELZER, supra note 179, at 31; see also SOLIS, supra note 14, at 205. 
 182.   Kramer, supra note 12, at 385; see also SOLIS, supra note 14, at 205. 
 183.   MELZER, supra note 179, at 70; see also SOLIS, supra note 14, at 205. 
 184.   See Marouda, supra note 79, at 237 (They “act most of the times outside the 
protection of the status of combatant [ ] when they participate actively in hostilities.”); 
see also SOLIS, supra note 14, at 208 (“Unlawful combatants sometimes band together to 
form unlawful combatant organizations; that is, armed opposition groups.”). 
 185.  Kramer, supra note 12, at 385; SOLIS, supra note 14, at 206. 
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operations amounting to direct participation in hostilities are assuming a 
continuous combat function.”186 
CCF is a functional approach that determines how to distinguish 
members of an organized armed group from civilians, as group members 
usually do not wear uniforms or fixed insignia.187  One indication that an 
individual is a member of an organized armed group is repeated direct 
participation in hostilities.188  Recruiters, trainers, and financiers are 
typically not included in CCF, and thus, persons exclusively carrying out 
these functions remain civilians.189  Like armed forces, organized armed 
groups may be accompanied by or supported by civilians who would not 
be subject to direct attack unless they were also directly participating in 
hostilities.190  Due to the difficulty in distinguishing members of organized 
armed groups from civilians, civilian status is the “default” classification 
when in doubt.191 
2.  Terrorists and “Unlawful Combatants” 
Terrorism has undoubtedly had an impact on armed conflict,192 as 
State responses to terrorist attacks have frequently triggered international 
armed conflicts.193  Indeed, both the United States and Israel have used 
the context of armed conflict to justify their actions to combat terrorism.194  
But, “terrorist” is not a category of actor defined in IHL.  Generally, 
terrorists are non-State actors195 who are often linked to insurgency, and 
 
 186.  MELZER, supra note 179, at 34. 
 187.  Jamie A. Williamson, Challenges of Twenty-First Century Conflicts: A Look 
at Direct Participation in Hostilities, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 457, 464 (2010). 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  Opportunity Lost, supra note 153, at 656. 
 190.  Williamson, supra note 187, at 464; see also Opportunity Lost, supra note 
153, at 656–57 (“Persons assuming this supporting function are equated to private 
contractors and civilian employees accompanying State armed forces.”). 
 191.  Williamson, supra note 187, at 464; see also Opportunity Lost, supra note 
153, at 656–57. 
 192.  CASSESE, supra note 130, at 403 (“Attacks on civilians (and even combatants) 
designed to spread terror have multiplied, particularly in occupied territories.”). 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  Targeted Killings Study, supra note 16, ¶ 47; see also Weiner, supra note 13, 
at 137 (President Bush “declared in the aftermath of September 11 that the United States 
was engaged in a war on terrorism.”) (emphasis added). 
 195.   Hans-Joachim Heintze, Do Non-State Actors Challenge International 
Humanitarian Law?, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW FACING NEW CHALLENGES 
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usually cannot be distinguished from civilians.196  Their goal is generally 
“the deliberate causing of death, or other serious injury, to civilians for 
political or ideological ends.”197 
Terrorists are not combatants since they usually do not belong to the 
armed forces of any one State.198  A terrorist is only a combatant if he or 
she meets the requirements for combatant status.  This means the terrorist 
would have to be a part of the armed forces of a State party or an 
organized armed group that is party to an armed conflict, wear a fixed 
distinctive sign, carry his or her arms openly, and follow the laws and 
customs of war.199  However, terror attacks are often carried out against 
civilians by individuals who do not wish to draw attention to themselves 
and thus do not wear a fixed, distinctive sign or carry their arms openly.200  
Because terrorists do not conform to combatant status, they are “not 
entitled to the status of prisoners of war; they can be put on trial for their 
membership in terrorist organizations and for their operations against the 
army.”201  As a result, terrorists are labeled as civilians, and can only be 
targeted for such time as they directly participate in hostilities.202  Direct 
participation in hostilities will be discussed in section III(C)(i) below. 
As there is no terrorist category in IHL, States have attempted to 
classify terrorists as “unlawful combatants” or “unlawful enemy  
combatants”203 in an effort to justify armed response to terrorism.204  
Individuals who unlawfully participate in hostilities—meaning, an 
individual who participates directly in the hostilities despite the fact that 
he or she has neither combatant status nor the legal right to participate—
 
163 (Heintschel von Heinegg & Volker Epping eds., 2007) (“Non-state actors can be 
defined as any actor other than a sovereign state.”). 
 196.   Marouda, supra note 79, at 238. 
 197.   Kretzmer, supra note 53, at 175. 
 198.   Id. at 191. 
 199.   Id.; see also Israel Case, supra note 19, para. 24 (“[T]he terrorist organizations 
from the area, and their members, do not fulfill the conditions for combatants . . . they 
have no fixed emblem recognizable at a distance, and they do not conduct their 
operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.”). 
 200.   Cf. John Yoo, Assassination or Targeted Killings After 9/11, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. 
L. REV. 57, 73 (2011–2012) (“Terrorists deliberately disguise themselves as civilians . . .  
and they attack by surprise.”). 
 201.   Israel Case, supra note 19, para. 25 (Terrorists “do not enjoy the status of 
prisoners of war.  They can be tried for their participation in hostilities, judged, and 
punished.”). 
 202.   Kretzmer, supra note 53, at 191. 
 203.   The term “unlawful combatant” in this article will refer to “unlawful combatant,” 
“unlawful enemy combatant,” and “unprivileged belligerent.” 
 204.   See CASSESE, supra note 130, at 403 (“[T]errorism has often constituted the 
triggering element of international armed conflicts.”). 
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are known as “unlawful combatants” or “unprivileged belligerents.”205  
States are hesitant to recognize insurgents and other non-State actors as 
combatants because they believe doing so would lend an air of legitimacy to 
those unlawful combatants, and would require that the State, upon 
capture of that individual, convey upon him or her privileges reserved 
specially for combatants.206  However, this does not change the fact that 
according to existing law, “unlawful combatants” are not combatants, 
but civilians who are without civilian protections so long as they are 
directly participating in hostilities.207 
The term “unlawful combatant” originated in Ex Parte Quirin, a 1942 
United States Supreme Court case that arose after the capture of German 
soldiers who had snuck into the United States during World War II.208  
Upon their arrival in the United States, the soldiers intentionally removed 
and hid their uniforms and explosive devices in an attempt to conceal 
their identities as enemy combatants.209  The Supreme Court analyzed 
the differences between members of the armed forces and civilians, and 
noted that, “[u]nlawful combatants are likewise subject to capture and 
detention, but in addition they are subject to trial and punishment by 
military tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful.”210  
This appears to be the reasoning that proponents of the unlawful combatant 
status have seized upon as support for the recognition of a new category.  
However, further reading of the opinion reveals the Supreme Court was 
referring to a combatant’s loss of combatant immunity upon commission 
of a violation of the laws of war, and not a change in status.  First, the 
Court noted that an enemy combatant who removes his uniform and sneaks 
through the lines for the purpose of waging war has violated the laws of 
war and is subject to punishment.211  Second, the Court observed that the 
United States Government recognized unprivileged belligerent status, 
 
 205.   Watkin, supra note 16, at 35; Ipsen, supra note 151, at 83 (“Such fighters 
cannot be classified as belonging to a state or a party to the conflict recognized as a 
subject of international law, and are therefore not authorized to undertake armed acts 
against the adversary.”); see also Fleck, supra note 31, at 613 (“Those who participate in 
hostilities without combatant status may be prosecuted under relevant criminal law for 
their belligerent actions[.]”). 
 206.   Kretzmer, supra note 53, at 197. 
 207.   See Israel Case, supra note 19, para. 26. 
 208.   Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 21 (1942). 
 209.   Id. 
 210.   Id. at 31. 
 211.   Id. 
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members of which are not entitled to combatant immunity, including 
combatants who do not wear the fixed emblem as required.212  Based on 
the definition of a lawful combatant, and the resulting consequences for 
not complying with the requirements of that status, it is clear the Supreme 
Court was not creating another category of “unlawful combatant;” it was 
merely using new terminology to describe the unlawful acts of enemy 
combatants. 
Since the events on September 11, 2001, there have been frequent 
attempts to recognize “unlawful combatant” as a new IHL category, in 
addition to the categories of combatant and civilian.213  Proponents of 
this classification claim that unlawful combatants should be considered 
combatants because they actively participate in the armed conflict although 
they are not members of the armed forces,214 yet should be denied 
combatant immunity as well as civilian and POW protections because of 
their unlawful participation in the hostilities.215  Specifically, the Bush 
Administration applied this definition to members of al Qaeda to justify 
the actions the United States took against the group.216  However, this 
argument makes it too easy to justify the targeting of civilians as it goes 
far beyond the reaches of direct participation in hostilities,217 discussed 
in section III(C)(i) below. 
Notably, unlawful combatant status does not appear in any international 
law convention or treaty, including the Geneva Conventions and their 
Additional Protocols,218 as it was not envisaged as a category in 
 
 212.   Id. at 35. 
 213.   Ipsen, supra note 151, at 83 (“The term ‘unlawful combatant’ was particularly 
used after September 11, 2001, to introduce a third category of persons which under 
existing law may be either combatants or civilians, but are denied such status as not 
fulfilling essential conditions.”). 
 214.   Israel Case, supra note 19, para. 27 (“These are people who take active and 
continuous part in an armed conflict, and therefore should be treated as combatants, in 
the sense that they are legitimate targets of attack, and they do not enjoy the protections 
granted to civilians.”). 
 215.   Israel Case, supra note 19, para. 27 (“[T]hey are not entitled to the rights and 
privileges of combatants, since they do not differentiate themselves from the civilian 
population, and since they do not obey the laws of war.”); SOLIS, supra note 14, at 207 
(“A characteristic of unlawful combatants is that upon capture they are not entitled to 
POW status.”). 
 216.   Eric Christensen, The Dilemma of Direct Participation in Hostilities, 19 FLA. 
ST. J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 281, 291 (2009). 
 217.   Id. at 282, 291. 
 218.   SOLIS, supra note 14, at 206–07; Christensen, supra note 216, at 286.  The 
First Geneva Convention protects the wounded and sick on the battlefield.  The Second 
Geneva Convention protects the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked at sea.  The Third 
Geneva Convention protects Prisoners of War, and the Fourth Geneva Convention 
protects civilians. 
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international humanitarian law.219  The argument that it was never meant 
to be a legitimate category is supported by the fact that Ex Parte Quirin 
was decided seven years before the 1949 Geneva Conventions were 
adopted, and although the Conventions created the new civilian 
category,220 the unlawful combatant category was not included.  
Furthermore, critics of the category maintain that the term is merely “a 
shorthand expression useful for describing those civilians who take up 
arms without being authorized to do so by international law,”221 and is 
simply a subset of civilian status.222  This view is supported by the ICTY; in 
Delalić, the Trial Chamber observed that individuals who do not fall 
within the ambit of the Third Geneva Convention, which protects POWs, 
are to be covered by the Fourth Convention, which provides protections 
for civilians.223  There is no “intermediate status” where the law would 
not apply to an individual;224 a person who falls into enemy hands is 
either a member of the armed forces’ medical personnel covered by the 
First Convention, a POW covered by the Third Convention, or a civilian 
covered by the Fourth Convention.225  Thus, unlawful combatant status 
is not a legitimate individual classification in the law of armed conflict.226 
 
 219.   Heintze, supra note 195, at 167. 
 220.   GREEN, supra note 26, at 53 (The 1949 Geneva Conventions replaced the 
1929 Geneva Conventions and created the completely new civilian convention.). 
 221.   Antonio Cassese, Expert Opinion on Whether Israel’s Targeted Killings of 
Palestinian Terrorists is Consonant with International Humanitarian Law ¶ 26, http://www. 
stoptorture.org.il/files/cassese.pdf [hereinafter “Expert Opinion”]. 
 222.   SOLIS, supra note 14, at 208. 
 223.   Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 271 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia  Nov. 16, 1998), http://www/icty.org/x/cases/mucic/tjug/en/ 
98/1116_judg_en.pdf. 
 224.   Heintze, supra note 195, at 167 (“An ‘unlawful combatant’ would therefore 
be placed outside the regime of international humanitarian law, and hence be unprotected 
by that body of law.”). 
 225.   INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC), COMMENTARY: IV GENEVA CONVENTION 
RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 51 (Jean Pictet ed., 
1958). 
 226.   CASSESE, supra note 130, at 409 (“This category can be accepted only if it is 
used for descriptive purposes.  Instead, it cannot be admitted as an intermediate category 
between combatants and civilians.”); Heintze, supra note 195, at 167 (“The correct 
position is that if a person is not a combatant in the sense of the Geneva Conventions, 
then he/she is a civilian subject to international criminal law and entitled to the protection 
of international human rights law.”). 
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B.  Noncombatant Status 
If combatants are members of the armed forces who are authorized to 
directly participate in the hostilities, noncombatants are the members of 
a party’s armed forces who do not have authorization to directly participate 
in the hostilities.227  Members of the latter category include war 
correspondents, members of the merchant marine, medical and religious 
personnel, quartermasters, members of the military administration and 
legal services, and other non-fighting personnel.228  Noncombatants are 
not protected from being the object of an attack, save for medical and 
religious personnel.229  Although noncombatants are not entitled to 
participate directly in the hostilities, they are still entitled to treatment 
as POWs upon capture.230  Finally, noncombatants are not civilians.231 
C.  Civilian Status 
Civilians are individuals who are not members of the armed forces, 
including persons who were, but have retired or otherwise left the 
service.232  They must not participate in military activities, as this activity is 
 
 227.   Ipsen, supra note 151, at 80. 
 228.   CRAWFORD, supra note 60, at 52; cf. Ipsen, supra note 151, at 96. 
 229.   See Ipsen, supra note 151, at 104 (Medical personnel “are protected by the 
absolute rule—continuously repeated by the Geneva Conventions—of respect and 
protection ‘under all circumstances’ against every attack . . . the position [for religious 
personnel] is the same as for medical personnel; both must be respected and protected 
under all circumstances, which also means that every attack against religious personnel 
is contrary to international law.”). 
 230.   CRAWFORD, supra note 60, at 52.  But, if a member of the religious or 
medical personnel directly participates in the hostilities, thus becoming an unlawful 
combatant, he would forfeit his noncombatant immunity and become a lawful target, as 
well as subject himself to criminal charges for his acts during combat.  SOLIS, supra note 
14, at 194. 
 231.   CRAWFORD, supra note 60, at 52; see also Ipsen, supra note 151, at 99 
(“[N]oncombatants are not nor could they under any circumstances be protected as 
civilians.”). 
 232.  Hans-Peter Gasser, Protection of the Civilian Population, in THE HANDBOOK 
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 238 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2d ed. 2010) (“[O]nly 
members of the armed forces are combatants.”); SOLIS, supra note 14, at 232 (“[A] 
civilian is anyone not a member of the armed forces.”); Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. 
IT-95-14-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 180 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia March 3, 
2000), http://www.itcy.org/x/cases/blaskic/tjug/en/blat000303e.pdf (Civilians are “persons 
who are not, or no longer, members of the armed forces.”); see also AP I, supra note 46, 
art. 50(1) (“A civilian is any person who does not belong to one of the categories of 
persons referred to in Article 4A (1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Third Convention and in 
Article 43 of this Protocol.”).  Although the US is not a signatory to AP I, many 
provisions of AP I are considered customary international law, including the principle of 
distinguishing between civilians and combatants.  See ICRC Study, supra note 24, at 187. 
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reserved for combatants.233  Civilians enjoy freedom from targeting and 
attack, as well as the right to be protected from such attack.234  Deliberate 
attacks on civilians are absolutely prohibited by IHL.235  Civilians are 
protected by the Fourth Geneva Convention; these protections were 
expanded by AP I.236  However, it is of note that the Convention protections 
only apply when civilians are actually in the “hands of the enemy,” and 
not in their home territory.237  Furthermore, the Convention protections 
begin to apply immediately upon commencement of the hostilities.238 
As opposed to combatants, who may be lawfully attacked based on 
their legal status, civilians may only be lawfully targeted when their 
actions permit it.239  This is known as direct participation in hostilities 
(“DPH”).  Upon joining the armed forces, civilians exchange their civilian 
rights for combatant rights.240  Civilians are not completely barred from 
actively participating in the hostilities,241 however, if they were to 
participate, their actions could result in either prosecution under domestic 
law or exposure to being targeted and killed by the enemy.242  Civilians 
who choose to participate in hostilities do not enjoy combatant immunity 
for the time period of such participation. 
1.  Direct Participation in Hostilities 
In armed conflict, a State may not lawfully attack civilians, regardless 
of whether the conflict is international or non-international.  This principle 
is expressed in AP I, Article 51, which sets out the customary protections 
from military activities enjoyed by the civilian population.243  But, Article 
 
 233.  Gasser, supra note 232, at 238; Jensen, supra note 154, at 91 (“Civilians are 
those who are not combatants and who are not taking actions normally reserved for 
combatants.”). 
 234.  Abresch, supra note 22, at 757; AP I, supra note 46, art. 51(2); Israel Case, 
supra note 19, para. 26 (noting the customary status of this principle). 
 235.  SOLIS, supra note 14, at 232; cf. Kretzmer, supra note 53, at 190 (“Under the 
law of international armed conflicts the only legitimate aim of force is weakening the 
military potential of the enemy.”). 
 236.  GREEN, supra note 26, at 256. 
 237.  Id. 
 238.  Id. at 258. 
 239.  Kretzmer, supra note 53, at 192. 
 240.  Abresch, supra note 22, at 757. 
 241.  Targeted Killings Study, supra note 16, ¶ 71. 
 242.  Id. 
 243.  ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 81, at 615, ¶ 1923 (Article 51 “explicitly 
confirms the customary rule that innocent civilians must be kept outside hostilities as far 
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51(3)244 introduces an exception to civilian immunity: direct participation in 
hostilities.245  Hostile acts are “acts which by their nature and purpose 
are intended to cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment of the 
armed forces.”246  DPH refers to conduct undertaken by civilians, such 
as directly attacking or engaging in acts of war against the enemy, which 
suspends their civilian protections.247  It can include actions taken against 
the civilian population, not just against the enemy’s armed forces.248  
DPH applies uniquely to civilians, and makes no distinction between 
participation in an international or non-international armed conflict. 249 
The principle of DPH reflects the idea that an individual may only be 
either a combatant, or a civilian, but not both simultaneously.250  Civilians 
who participate in hostilities do not lose their civilian status, only its 
accompanying protections.251  These civilians do not attain combatant 
status, and will not receive any of the privileges reserved specifically for 
combatants, such as combatant immunity.252  Thus, civilians who 
unlawfully engage in armed conflict have the status of a civilian directly 
participating in hostilities. 
If a civilian participates directly in hostilities, he or she may then be 
lawfully targeted, but only for the duration of his or her participation,253 
 
as possible.”); see Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 220 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 31, 2005), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/ 
strugar/tjug/en/str-tj050131e.pdf  (“[T]he prohibition of attacks on civilians stated in the 
Additional Protocols attained the status of customary international law.”); see also Israel 
Case, supra note 19, para. 30 (The Supreme Court of Israel noted that although Israel 
was not a party to AP I, this principle has achieved customary status.). 
 244.   “Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this section, unless and for 
such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.” AP I, supra note 46, art. 51(2). 
 245.   See SOLIS, supra note 14, at 202; ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 81, at 618, 
¶ 1942; see Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Trial Transcript, (Nov. 
24, 2006), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc224353.PDF. 
 246.   ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 81, ¶ 1942. 
 247.   MELZER, supra note 179, at 12; see SOLIS, supra note 14, at 203; HENDERSON, 
supra note 157, at 98–99. 
 248.   Israel Case, supra note 19, ¶ 33. 
 249.   SOLIS, supra note 14, at 202. 
 250.   Id. at 233. 
 251.   Israel Case, supra note 19, ¶ 31. 
 252.   Id. ¶ 26 (“[A] civilian who takes a direct part in the hostilities does not, at 
such time, enjoy the protection granted to a civilian who is not taking a direct part in the 
hostilities.  [The result is] that an unlawful combatant is not a combatant, rather a 
‘civilian.’”). 
 253.   ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 81, ¶ 1942; see also Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, 
supra note 87,  ¶ 99 (“However, if civilians take a direct part in the hostilities, they then 
lose their right to protection as civilians per se and could fall within the class of 
combatant.”); CASSESE, supra note 130, at 421 (“However, if civilians take a direct part 
in hostilities, . . . they may be targeted while they are actually engaging in combat, or 
while carrying arms openly during a military deployment preceding an attack in which 
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because civilian protections are not permanently lost with the commission 
of a single act.254  This does not mean that upon subsequent capture he or 
she is immune from punitive measures for such participation.255  It is 
important to note that DPH only includes conduct that directly supports 
combat, such as using weapons in the conflict, gathering intelligence, or 
preparing for hostilities;256 merely belonging to a group that conducts 
terrorist attacks does not imply that a civilian has directly participated in 
hostilities.257  However, DPH does not include participation in the war 
effort, as many States often require such participation from the general 
population in times of armed conflict.258  The ICTY has noted that while 
membership in the armed forces can be a strong indication that an 
individual is DPH, it alone is not enough to establish DPH.259  The 
determination of whether a civilian has directly participated in hostilities 
requires a case-by-case analysis.260 
Three elements must be met for an act to be considered direct 
participation in hostilities: a threshold of harm, a direct causation between 
the harm and the act, and a belligerent nexus.261  The first element, the 
 
they participate. . .”); HENDERSON, supra note 157, at 95 (“A civilian loses their protection 
from attack only for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.”). 
 254.   HENDERSON, supra note 157, at 95 (“[A] civilian does not lose protection 
from attack once and for all by a single act of taking a direct part in hostilities.”). 
 255.   ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 81, at 619, ¶ 1944. 
 256.  Targeted Killings Study, supra note 16, ¶ 60 (“[I]n order to protect the vast 
majority of civilians, direct participation may only include conduct close to that of a 
fighter, or conduct that directly supports combat.”); Israel Case, supra note 19, para. 33. 
 257.  Kretzmer, supra note 53, at 192; see also SOLIS, supra note 14, at 544 (“Mere 
membership in a terrorist organization, without more, is not sufficient to render one the 
lawful target of an opposing military armed force.”). 
 258.   ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 81,  ¶ 1944, at 619; see also MELZER, supra 
note 179, at 11 (“Throughout history, the civilian population has always contributed to 
the general war effort of parties to armed conflicts, for example through the production 
and supply of weapons, equipment, food, and shelter, or through economic, administrative, 
and political support.”); Targeted Killings Report, supra note 16, ¶ 64 (“These criteria 
generally exclude conduct that is clearly indirect, including general support for the war 
effort.”). 
 259.  Prosecutor v. Halilović, Case No. IT-01-48-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 34, n.78 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 2005) (“The Trial Chamber notes 
that a person may be listed as a member of an armed force, without being mobilised.  
Furthermore, it is possible that in a state of war, the civilian police by law become part of 
the armed forces.”). 
 260.   Kretzmer, supra note 53, at 192. 
 261.   MELZER, supra note 179, at 46. 
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threshold of harm, requires “that the act be directed at the destruction of 
either the military property of one of the parties of the armed conflict, or 
at the infliction of harm on the persons or property of civilians or those 
otherwise protected from direct attack.”262  The direct causation element 
requires a direct link between the act and the harm likely to be caused.263  
It is not enough that an act resulted in some kind of harm, such as death 
or injury to a person or property; rather, the act must be committed with 
the intent to cause that harm.264  Finally, the belligerent nexus element of 
DPH requires that the civilian’s act must be done with the intention of 
benefiting one party of the armed conflict at the other party’s detriment.265  
Note that the intent requirement here demands a state of mind that is 
greater than “mere thoughtless violence.”266 
Critics of a narrow interpretation of DPH believe it creates a “revolving 
door” or “farmer by day, terrorist by night” problem, meaning civilians 
can repeatedly rotate between immune civilian activities, such as farming, 
and direct participation in hostilities.267  However, this criticism is flawed; 
 
In order to qualify as direct participation in hostilities, a specific act must meet 
the following cumulative criteria: 
1.   the act must be likely to adversely affect the military operations or military 
capacity of a party to an armed conflict or, alternatively, to inflict death, 
injury, or destruction on persons or objects protected against direct attack 
(threshold of harm), and 
2.  there must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm likely to 
result either from that act, or from a coordinated military operation of 
which that act constitutes an integral part (direct causation), and 
3.  the act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required threshold 
of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of another 
(belligerent nexus). 
Id. 
 262.  Kramer, supra note 12, at 386; see also Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. 
ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 100 (Dec. 6. 1999) (“To take a ‘direct’ part in 
the hostilities means acts of war which by their nature or purpose are likely to cause 
actual harm to the personnel and equipment of the enemy armed forces.”); Prosecutor v. 
Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 279 (Jan. 27, 2000) (“To 
take a ‘direct’ part in the hostilities means acts of war which by their nature or purpose 
are likely to cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment of the enemy armed 
forces.”); Halilović, Case No. IT-01-48-T, ¶ 33 n.75 (“The Trial Chamber notes that 
‘[active] participation in hostilities’ has been defined by the delegates as ‘acts of war 
which by their nature or purpose are likely to cause actual harm to the personnel and 
equipment of the enemy armed forces.’”) (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
 263.  MELZER, supra note 179, at 46; Kramer, supra note 12, at 386. 
 264.  Kramer, supra note 12, at 386 (“[T]he harm must be intended to be the direct 
effect of the act.”); MELZER, supra note 179, at 46. 
 265.  Kramer, supra note 12, at 387; MELZER, supra note 179, at 46. 
 266.  Kramer, supra note 12, at 387. 
 267.  HENDERSON, supra note 157, at 95; see also SOLIS, supra note 14, at 208 
(noting that the concept “farmer by day, fighter by night” is founded on the idea that “[a] 
person . . . engages in military raids by night, while purporting to be an innocent civilian 
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there are no provisions found in IHL that permit an individual to bounce 
between combatant and civilian status.268 Once a civilian becomes a 
member of the military, that civilian is a combatant for the duration of 
the hostilities regardless of whether he or she is in combat or even armed.269  
Furthermore, one of IHL’s core principles is to protect civilians who are not 
a military threat, so the “revolving door” scenario is not a flaw in need 
of correction.270  The narrow interpretation of DPH is consistent with 
the following rationale: “the prohibition against targeting a civilian who 
does not take a direct part in hostilities, despite his possible (previous or 
future) involvement in fighting, is linked to the need to avoid killing 
innocent civilians.”271 
It is logical, then, that a broad interpretation of DPH runs the risk of 
increasing the possibility of attacks on civilians.272  Proponents of a 
broad interpretation of DPH may argue it discourages civilians from 
participating in hostilities and, in fact, protects combatants.273  The 
Supreme Court of Israel closely examined the principle of DPH as part 
of its analysis of the legality of Israel’s targeted killing policy.274  Israel 
implemented a targeted killing policy in response to thousands of terror 
attacks, and opponents challenged this policy on the basis that it violated 
the rights of targeted individuals.275  The Israeli Supreme Court noted 
 
by day.”); Kretzmer, supra note 53, at 193 (“[T]errorists enjoy the best of both worlds – 
they can remain civilians most of the time and only endanger their protection as civilians 
while actually in the process of carrying out a terrorist act.”). 
 268.  INTER-AM. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.116, REPORT ON 
TERRORISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 62–63 (2002), available at http://cidh.oas.org/Terrorism/ 
Eng/exe.htm (“[O]nce a person qualifies as a combatant, whether regular or irregular, 
privileged or unprivileged, he or she cannot on demand revert back to civilian status or 
otherwise alternate between combatant and civilian status.”); see also ICRC COMMENTARY, 
supra note 81, ¶ 1677, at 515, (“[A]ny concept of a part-time status, a semi-civilian, 
semi-military status, a soldier by night and peaceful citizen by day, also disappears.”). 
 269.  ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 81, ¶ 1677, at 515. 
 270.  MELZER, supra note 179, at 70 (“The ‘revolving door’ of civilian protection is 
an integral part, not a malfunction, of IHL.  It prevents attacks on civilians who do not, at 
the time, represent a military threat.”). 
 271.  CASSESE, supra note 130, at 421. 
 272.  Radsan & Murphy, supra note 5, at 1233. 
 273.  Israel Case, supra note 19, ¶ 34. 
 274.  Id. at ¶ 32 (“The first part [concerns] the requirement that the civilians take 
part in hostilities; the second part [concerns] the requirement that civilians take a ‘direct’ 
part in hostilities; the third part [concerns] the provision by which civilians are not 
protected from attack ‘for such time’ as they take a direct part in hostilities.”). 
 275.     See id. ¶¶ 1–2. 
CLINE (DO NOT DELETE, OR ADD TEXT IN THIS AREA) 10/19/2016  5:20 PM 
 
90 
the possibility that a civilian may take part in hostilities without bearing 
arms since gathering intelligence or preparing for the hostilities is enough to 
qualify as DPH.276  Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Israel interpreted 
DPH broadly, and noted that civilians lose immunity when they prepare 
for hostilities, participate in planning a hostile act, or, as a member of a 
terrorist group, participate in a “chain of hostilities.”277  This decision, 
however, has been criticized for its deleterious effect on the meaning of 
DPH.278 
2.  Direct Participation in Hostilities versus Continuous                         
Combat Function 
DPH appears to have a lower threshold than CCF; an individual can 
be directly participating in hostilities, yet not repeatedly enough to 
qualify as a member of an organized armed group based on CCF.  Recall 
that CCF requires lasting integration of the participating individual into 
the armed group and depends on the individual’s continuous function.279  
Thus, under CCF, an occasional hostile act would not qualify an individual 
for membership in the organized armed group.280  DPH, on the other 
hand, has a different temporal component; civilians who directly participate 
may only be lawfully targeted for the time they participate in that act, 
marking the distinction between “for such time” with DPH, as opposed 
to “all the time” with CCF.281  Further, CCF can attach to an individual 
before that individual even commits an act; DPH will only attach once 
the act has begun.282 
Critics of the CCF approach point out that the definition is troubling 
because it permits the targeting of members of organized armed groups 
 
 276.   Id. ¶ 33 (“[T]here is no condition that the civilian use his weapon, nor is their 
[sic] a condition that he bear arms (openly or concealed).  It is possible to take part in 
hostilities without using weapons at all.”). 
 277.   Radsan & Murphy, supra note 5, at 1212. 
 278.   Id. (“This interpretation, however, drains close to all meaning from ‘direct’ 
participation.”). 
 279.   SOLIS, supra note 14, at 206. 
 280.   Id. (“Thus, a civilian’s unorganized or occasional hostile act does not constitute 
membership in an organized armed group or represent continuous combat function.”). 
 281.   Targeted Killings Study, supra note 16, ¶ 62 (“[D]irect participation for 
civilians is limited to each single act: the earliest point of direct participation would be 
the concrete preparatory measures for that specific act, . . . and participation terminates 
when the activity ends.”); id. ¶ 65. 
 282.   See MELZER, supra note 179, at 34 (“An individual recruited, trained and 
equipped by such a group to continuously and directly participate in hostilities on its 
behalf can be considered to assume a continuous combat function even before he or she 
first carries out a hostile act.”). 
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any time and anywhere.283  CCF does not seem to allow for individuals 
to disengage from their function.284  However, proponents of the principle 
argue CCF has solved DPH’s “revolving door” problem discussed above.285  
The principle of DPH does not address how many times a civilian can 
pass through the revolving door, while CCF dictates that at some point, 
the civilian will eventually become a member of an organized armed 
group.286 
D.  Mercenaries 
Mercenaries are persons recruited to directly participate in hostilities 
on behalf of a party to an armed conflict.287 AP I, Article 47 provides 
criteria for determining who qualifies as a mercenary.  Generally, the 
recruited individual will not have legal ties with the “hiring” party, such 
as the same nationality or residency in a territory controlled by that party 
if it is a State.288  Mercenaries are also not members of a State’s armed 
forces (if the hiring party is a State), and are not entitled to receive 
combatant or POW status.289  A mercenary’s motivation is purely monetary, 
and payment received for their services generally exceeds that of a 
typical combatant.290 
E.  Civilian Contractors 
Private contractors are a result of shrinking defense budgets and the 
downsizing of military forces.291  Both the United States Department of 
 
 283.  Targeted Killings Study, supra note 16, ¶ 65. 
 284.  Alston, supra note 6, at 325 (“Individuals are no longer targeted solely on the 
basis of their status as combatants, but of their individual profiles.”). 
 285.  See, e.g., SOLIS, supra note 14, at 206 (“[A]n al Qaeda leader does not regain 
civilian protection against direct attack merely because he temporarily stores his weapon 
to visit his family in government-controlled territory.”). 
 286.  Opportunity Lost, supra note 153, at 661 (“[W]hen individuals go beyond 
spontaneous, sporadic, or unorganized direct participation, they become members of an 
organized armed group.”). 
 287.  Ipsen, supra note 151, at 84. 
 288.  Id. 
 289.  Id. at 83. 
 290.  Id. at 84. 
 291.  Id. at 107; see also Eugenio Cusumano, Policy Prospects for Regulating 
Private Military and Security Companies, in WAR BY CONTRACT: HUMAN RIGHTS, 
HUMANITARIAN LAW, AND PRIVATE CONTRACTORS 11, 12 (Francesco Francioni & Natalino 
Ronzitti, eds., 2011) (“First, the downsizing of major armies broadened the supply of 
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Defense (“DOD”) and Department of State employ private civilian 
contractors.292  These civilians perform a wide variety of job functions, 
most of which are support functions.293  Many private contractors maintain 
weapons systems, handle security against opposing forces, and even 
gather intelligence.294  Civilians employed as private contractors are not 
combatants, as they do not belong to the State’s armed forces,295 and 
thus, do not have combatant immunity.296  Additionally, they cannot 
lawfully target and attack enemy combatants unless it is a use of force 
in self-defense.297 
F.  Prisoners of War 
The Third Geneva Convention governs the treatment of prisoners of 
war, and its protections are generally considered customary law.298  
Prisoners of war are those persons who have fallen into the hands of the 
enemy forces.299  Diplomats do not receive POW status, but rather must 
be returned to their home country.300  POW protection stems from the 
idea that “captured combatants no longer pose any threat to the lives of 
the persons who capture them nor to the detaining power.”301  If it is not 
clear whether the captured belligerent is entitled to receive POW status, 
the presumption is in favor of POW status.302 
Classifying the individuals involved in armed conflict is important 
because it provides guidance regarding which individuals may or may 
not lawfully take part in the armed conflict, and whom the enemy may 
target during the hostilities.  The main actors in an international armed 
conflict are combatants, noncombatants, and civilians.  In non-international 
 
military expertise enormously.  At the same time, the transformations within Western 
armies increased the demand for external contractors.”); Christensen, supra note 170, at 
295. 
 292.  Cusumano, supra note 291, at 14. 
 293.  Christensen, supra note 170, at 295. 
 294.  Id. 
 295.  Dekker & Myjer, supra note 174, at 176; Christensen, supra note 170, at 296. 
 296.  Ipsen, supra note 151, at 108.  However, they “enjoy immunity from attack as 
civilians unless and as long as they participate directly in the hostilities.”  Dekker & 
Myjer, supra note 174, at 176. 
 297.  Dekker & Mjyer, supra note 174, at 176. 
 298.  GREEN, supra note 26, at 224.  Thus, the basic principles of GC III are binding 
upon States who are not parties to the Geneva Convention.  See also Horst Fischer, 
Protection of Prisoners of War, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW 367, 371 (Dieter Fleck, ed., 2d. ed. 2008). 
 299.  GREEN, supra note 26, at 224–25. 
 300.  Id. at 226. 
 301.  Fischer, supra note 298, at 367. 
 302.  Id. at 374. 
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armed conflict, there are no combatants or non-combatants, rather, members 
of organized armed groups are engaged in hostilities.  However, civilian 
status is found in non-international armed conflict.  Furthermore, there is 
no “terrorist” or “unlawful combatant” classification in either international 
or non-international armed conflict.  During the hostilities, combatants 
and noncombatants (except for religious and medical personnel) are the 
only individuals who may lawfully be targeted; civilians can never lawfully 
be targeted, unless and for such time as they are directly participating in 
hostilities.  These classifications are also important as they assist in 
assessing which individuals may lawfully be the objects of a targeted 
killing, which is discussed in the following section. 
IV. TARGETED KILLINGS 
For the past decade, the United States has increasingly used drone 
strikes to target, attack, and kill members of al Qaeda, the Taliban, and 
individuals who support the two groups in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, 
Pakistan, and Somalia.303  The targeted individuals are “deemed dangerous, 
and their inclusion on what are known as kill/lists is based on undisclosed 
intelligence applied against secret criteria.”304  The CIA drone strike 
program is perceived as highly effective, and is set to expand in the coming 
years.305  However, critics of the program argue these targeted killings 
violate international law.306  This section will examine targeted killings, 
and identify the situations in which they are legal. 
A.  The Legality of Targeted Killings 
A targeted killing is a State-sanctioned targeting and killing of a 
specific individual, usually a civilian or unlawful combatant.307  The 
 
 303.   SOLIS, supra note 14, at 538; LYDIA DE BEER, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 
(DRONES) AND LAW 26 (Lydia de Beer ed., 2011) (“Target killing is a well  known 
phenomenon in the United States’ fight against terrorism.”); Targeted Killings Study, 
supra note 16, ¶ 18. 
 304.   Alston, supra note 6, at 285. 
 305.   Id. at 286. 
 306.   See id.; Ackerman, supra note 2. 
 307.   See DE BEER, supra note 303, at 26 (A targeted killing is the “targeting and 
killing, by a government or its agents, of a civilian or ‘unlawful combatant’ taking a 
direct part in hostilities in the context of an armed conflict who is not in that 
government’s custody and cannot be reasonably apprehended.”); see also NILS MELZER, 
TARGETED KILLING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (Vaughan Lowe ed., 2008) (It is “the use 
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targeting and killing of a civilian in armed conflict is lawful when the 
individual loses his or her Geneva Convention protections for some 
reason, such as directly participating in hostilities.308  Although it is not a 
new concept,309 the term “targeted killing” only recently came into 
existence after Israel engaged in the public targeting and killing of 
alleged terrorists in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip during the “second 
intifada.”310  Ironically, the United States was once a critic of Israel’s 
policy,311 yet is now criticized for its targeted killing practices.312 
Targeted killings have occurred both in times of peace and armed 
conflict,313 and can be carried out in multiple ways, including shooting 
from a close range or sniper fire, and using drones, poison, bombs, or 
missiles.314  While there is no legal distinction between a targeted killing 
carried out by drone, helicopter, or plane,315 IHL does (and should) demand 
 
of lethal force attributable to a subject of international law with the intent, premeditation, 
and deliberation to kill individually selected persons who are not in the physical custody 
of those targeting them.”); SOLIS, supra note 14, at 538 (A targeted killing is “the 
intentional killing of a specific civilian or unlawful combatant who cannot reasonably be 
apprehended who is taking a direct part in hostilities, the targeting done at the direction 
of the state, in the context of an international or non-international armed conflict”). 
 308.   DE BEER, supra note 303, at 26; see Amos Guiora, Targeted Killing as Active 
Self-Defense, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 319, 329 (2004) (The targeted individual “is 
not an innocent civilian according to the Geneva Conventions.  Rather, the individual is 
an illegal combatant who has either participated in terror attacks or ordered them to be 
carried out.”); see also Alston, supra note 6, at 301 (“Under the rules of IHL, reprisal or 
punitive attacks on civilians are prohibited, and targeted killing is only lawful when the 
target is a ‘combatant’ or ‘fighter’ or, in the case of a civilian, only for such time as the 
person ‘directly participates in hostilities.’”). 
 309.   See Targeted Killings Study, supra note 16, ¶ 11 (“The phenomenon of targeted 
killing has been present throughout history.”); see also Yoo, supra note 200, at 63 
(“Precise attacks against individuals have long been a feature of warfare.”). 
 310.   Targeted Killings Study, supra note 16, ¶ 7; see also Alston, supra note 6, at 
296 (At the time, the Israeli Military Intelligence Directorate “argued that they should be 
termed ‘preventive killing,’ which was consistent with the fact that they were ‘acts of 
self-defence and justified on moral, ethical and legal grounds.’”); Israel Case, supra note 
19, ¶¶ 1–2. 
 311.   The Consequences of Selected Killing, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 4, 2001, at 40 
(“The United States, in unwontedly strong language in relation to Israel, condemned [the 
targeted killing of Palestinian activists] as ‘excessive and highly provocative.’”). 
 312.   Cf. Kretzmer, supra note 53, at 173 (“The Yemen attack by the US and the 
‘targeted killings’ by Israeli forces have been castigated by human rights NGOs, and 
some UN bodies as ‘extra-judicial’ executions.’”). 
 313.   Targeted Killings Study, supra note 16, ¶ 8. 
 314.   Id. 
 315.   Alston, supra note 6, at 324; see Targeted Killings Study, supra note 16, ¶ 79 
(“A missile fired from a drone is no different from any other commonly used weapon, 
including a gun fired by a soldier or a helicopter or gunship that fires missiles.”). 
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more from the drone pilot, as AP I requires a “default” assignment of 
civilian status where an individual’s exact legal status is unclear.316 
The intent of targeted killings is to use lethal force,317 which distinguishes 
them from “unintentional, accidental, or reckless killings, or killings 
made without conscious choice.”318  Killing on the battlefield occurs when 
lawful combatants target, aim, and fire at their enemies who may be mere 
yards away.319  By contrast, targeted killings occur when a drone, manned 
by someone thousands of miles away, fires upon a target likely unaware 
of its target status.  Targeted killings are controversial because typically 
the individual has not been given a trial or even a hearing, and he or she 
has no recourse, such as an appeal, for the targeting order.320 
For a targeted killing to be lawful under IHL, it must be conducted in 
the theater of an armed conflict.321  Human rights law governs targeted 
killings conducted outside the scope of an armed conflict,322 and the 
permissible level of force is limited based on the threat the suspect poses 
to others.323  Under human rights law, States are severely restricted in 
their “authority to kill—outside the full [judicial] process—to situations 
where the target poses an imminent risk of death or serious injury to 
others.”324  Thus, IHL gives States greater authority to target and 
kill enemy combatants and civilians who are participating directly in the 
hostilities.325  Targeted killings may also be conducted in relation to the 
use of force, usually as self-defense in response to an armed attack.326 
In situations of international armed conflict, the targeted individual 
must be a direct participant in the hostilities, such as a combatant  or 
 
 316.   Radsan & Murphy, supra note 5, at 1226 (“Article 50(1) of Additional 
Protocol I declares that ‘[i]n case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person 
shall be considered to be a civilian.’”). 
 317.   Alston, supra note 6, at 298 (referencing MELZER, supra note 307, at 5). 
 318.   Id. 
 319.   SOLIS, supra note 14, at 538. 
 320.   Guiora, supra note 308, at 329 (“[T]he targeted individual is not afforded a 
hearing or granted the right to appeal the decision to target him (to date women have not 
been targeted). . .”). 
 321.   SOLIS, supra note 14, at 542; see also Israel Case, supra note 19, ¶ 61 
(determining the drone strikes were governed by IHL.). 
 322.   Targeted Killings Study, supra note 16, ¶ 31. 
 323.   Id. ¶ 32. 
 324.   Radsan & Murphy, supra note 5, at 1208. 
 325.   Id. at 1205 (“[S]tates have broader authority to kill under IHL than under 
human rights law that generally controls outside armed conflicts.”); see also id. at 1208. 
 326.   Alston, supra note 6, at 305–06. 
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participating civilian, at the time the targeted killing is carried out.327  
Targeted killings are legal in non-international armed conflict if the 
target is a fighter or civilian who is directly participating in hostilities.328  
Thus, two elements must be analyzed when determining whether the 
targeted killing was lawful: the legal status of the conflict, and the legal 
status of the target.329  Furthermore, only a senior military commander is 
permitted to authorize targeted killings.330  This is to ensure the targeted 
killing is necessary, because “AP I requires that those who plan or decide an 
attack are to do everything feasible to verify that an objective is a military 
objective and that the objective is not subject to special protection.”331  
Finally, the use of force must be proportionate so as to prevent harm to 
civilians in the vicinity of the attack.332 
What about the targeted killing of terrorists?  That is, after all, the 
purpose of the United States’ drone strike program: to target and kill 
members of al Qaeda, the Taliban, and their supporters, all of whom are 
the enemy in the “war on terror.”333  Based on the above, targeted killing 
of terrorists may only be carried out on those terrorists who, in situations 
of armed conflict are combatants or civilians directly participating in 
hostilities (or members of an organized armed group in non-international 
 
 327.   See, e.g., SOLIS, supra note 14, at 543 (The targeted individual “must be 
directly participating in the hostilities, either as a continuous combat function or as a 
spontaneous, unorganized act.”); Targeted Killings Study, supra note 16, ¶ 30 (Targeted 
killing is lawful under IHL only “when the target is a ‘combatant’ or ‘fighter’ or, in the 
case of a civilian, only for such time as the person ‘directly participates in hostilities.’  In 
addition, the killing must be militarily necessary, [and] the use of force must be 
proportionate . . .”); Kramer, supra note 12, at 381 (“[T]argeted killing in a time of 
armed conflict is not an assassination, and is therefore permissible domestic policy.”). 
 328.   E.g., Kramer, supra note 12, at 382; Alston, supra note 6, at 301. 
 329.   E.g.,Kramer, supra note 12, at 382; see also SOLIS, supra note 14, at 542–43.  
“Recall the five characteristics of the definition of targeted killing. . . an international or 
non-international armed conflict must be in progress . . . the victim must be a specific 
individual . . . the individual who has engaged directly in hostilities must be beyond 
reasonable possibility of arrest . . . only a senior military commander representing the 
targeting state may authorize a targeted killing . . . the targeted individual must be directly 
participating in the hostilities. . .”) 
 330.   SOLIS, supra note 14, at 543 (“[O]nly a senior military commander representing 
the targeting state may authorize a targeted killing.”). 
 331.   HENDERSON, supra note 157, at 234. 
 332.   Alston, supra note 6, at 302 (“[T]he use of force must be proportionate so that 
any anticipated military advantage is considered in light of the expected harm to civilians 
in the vicinity, and everything feasible must be done to prevent mistakes and minimize 
collateral harm to civilians.”). 
 333.  See Jane Mayer, The Predator War: What are the risks of the C.I.A.’s covert 
drone program?, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 26, 2009, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/ 
2009/10/26/091026fa_fact_mayer (“The C.I.A.’s [drone strike] program is aimed at 
terror suspects around the world, including in countries where U.S. troops are not 
based.”). 
CLINE (DO NOT DELETE, OR ADD TEXT IN THIS AREA) 10/19/2016  5:20 PM 
[VOL. 15:  51, 2013]  CIA Officers Involved in Drone Strikes 
  SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 
 97 
armed conflict), or in situations outside armed conflict, pose an imminent 
risk of injury or death to others.334  The third possibility involves targeting 
terrorists in response to an armed attack; if a terrorist group carries out 
an armed attack on a State, that State is then entitled to defend itself 
against that group under the UN Charter.335  The next section will discuss 
self-defense in response to armed attacks from non-State actors. 
A targeted killing carried out on the territory of another State may 
raise questions about State sovereignty.336  However, there will be no 
violation of a State’s sovereignty if the “receiving” State consents to the 
targeting State’s presence, or if the targeting State asserts its right to use 
force in self-defense.337  But, the targeting and consenting States must 
still abide by their legal obligations under both IHL and human rights 
law regarding the use of force against an individual.338  Thus, “[a] 
consenting State may only lawfully authorize a killing by the targeting 
State to the extent that the killing is carried out in accordance with 
applicable IHL or human rights law.”339  If the consenting State discovers 
the killing was unlawful, it then has a duty to seek the prosecution of 
those responsible.340 
B.  Self-Defense 
The United States justifies its targeting and killing of members of al 
Qaeda as an exercise of its right of self-defense.341  This claim is based 
on Article 51 of the UN Charter.  Recall that the UN Charter governs jus 
ad bellum, i.e. when States may resort to the use of force.  Although 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the use of force, Article 51 permits 
 
 334.  Guiora, supra note 308, at 331 (“Targeted killing can only be implemented 
against those terrorists who either directly or indirectly participate in terrorism in a 
fashion that is equivalent to involvement in armed conflict.”). 
 335.  See Kretzmer, supra note 53, at 188. 
 336.  Alston, supra note 6, at 305 (“Targeted killings conducted in the territory of 
other states raise sovereignty concerns.”). 
 337.  Id. at 306 (The use of force in self-defense would be permitted by the UN 
Charter if: “(i) the second state is responsible for an armed attack against the first state, 
or (ii) the second state is unwilling or unable to stop armed attacks against the first state 
launched from its territory.”). 
 338.  Targeted Killings Study, supra note 16, ¶ 37. 
 339.  Id. 
 340.  Id. ¶ 38. 
 341.  Weiner, supra note 13, at 141. 
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a State to use force in response to an armed attack.342  The ICJ noted in 
Nicaragua that merely providing arms to an opposition group is not an 
armed attack on another state.343  Furthermore, a significant period of time 
between the alleged armed attack and the State’s claim of self-defense in 
response to that armed attack, such as the three years El Salvador waited 
before requesting United States assistance, is an indicator that an armed 
attack has not actually occurred.344  Only the gravest instances of the use 
of force will constitute an armed attack.345 
The requirement that an armed attack occur before the right of self-
defense is triggered applies both where the victim State exercises this right 
on its own, as well as where another asserts this right on behalf of the 
victim State.346  The wording of Article 51 seemingly narrows the previous 
customary law right of self-defense, which sprang from the Caroline 
affair in 1837.347  The customary law definition, or “the Caroline doctrine,” 
permits self-defense when the need for action in self-defense is instant 
and overwhelming, and there is no other choice or time to consider an 
alternative.348  The Caroline, a United States steamboat, was attacked by 
British forces while transporting supplies over the Niagara River to 
Canadian insurgents.349  The American Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, 
determined that Britain’s actions did not meet the time or choice conditions, 
and thus, did not qualify as self-defense.350  In his opinion, self-defense 
was limited to “situations where there is a real threat, the response 
 
 342.  Greenwood, supra note 18, at 5; id. at 2 (“States may resort to force only in 
the exercise of their inherent right of individual or collective self-defence.”); Nicaragua, 
supra note 64, ¶ 232 (“The exercise of the right of collective self-defence presupposes 
that an armed attack has occurred. . .”). 
 343.  Nicaragua, supra note 64, ¶ 230. 
 344.  Id. ¶ 236. 
 345.  Id. ¶ 191; see also Andrew C. Orr, Unmanned, Unprecedented, and Unresolved: 
The Status of American Drone Strikes in Pakistan Under International Law, 44 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 729, 737 (2011). 
 346.  JAMES A. GREEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND SELF-DEFENCE 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 26 (2009). 
 347.  See Guiora, supra note 308, at 323; see also Peter Haggenmacher, Self-Defence as 
a General Principle of Law and its Relation to War, in SELF-DEFENCE AS A FUNDAMENTAL 
PRINCIPLE 3, 10 (Arthur Eyffinger et al. eds., 2009) (This definition was considered 
customary international law until the UN Charter narrowed the definition  of self-
defense); Jaemin Lee, Terrorism Prevention and the Right of Preemptive Self-Defense, 1 
J. E. ASIA & INT’L L. 291, 294 (2008) (“As is well known, the Caroline case provides a 
classic guideline for the right of self-defense under customary international law.”). 
 348.  Guiora, supra note 308, at 323 (“Self-defense is only justified ‘if the necessity 
of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no 
moment for deliberation.’”); see also Haggenmacher, supra note 347, at 10. 
 349.  Guiora, supra note 306, at 323. 
 350.  Id.; Haggenmacher, supra note 347, at 10. 
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is essential and proportional, and all peaceful means of resolving the 
dispute have been exhausted.”351 
Situations where Article 51 justifies self-defense may include a State 
using military force directly against another State that is involved with 
terrorist actors.352  But disagreement exists over the question of whether 
self-defense may be invoked when there has been an armed attack by a 
non-State actor.353  The ICJ recently held that self-defense may only be 
invoked when the armed attack is imputable to a State or State actors.354  
Either test discussed in Part II above, the “effective control” or “overall 
control” test, may establish whether the State can be held responsible for 
the actions of the non-State actors.355  Recall that the effective control 
test, developed by the ICJ, requires more than mere control and dependence 
in order for the actions of the non-State actors to be attributed to the 
State.356  It is not clear which test the United States utilizes, but it likely 
would prefer the overall control test, partly due to its lower threshold, 
and partly because this has become the preferred test internationally.357 
The only other instance when a State may be held responsible for the 
actions of non-State actors is if “it fails to take all necessary steps to prevent 
the effects of the conduct of [the non-State actor].”358  Opponents of 
restricting self-defense to situations of attack by State actors point out the 
customary law basis of self-defense itself, the Caroline doctrine, which 
arose from a situation of non-State hostilities.359  Opponents also cite 
Article 51’s drafting history, where one of the rejected versions of the 
 
 351.  Guiora, supra note 308, at 323. 
 352.  Heintze, supra note 195, at 166. 
 353.  MYRA WILLIAMSON, TERRORISM, WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 158 (2009) 
(“Although states traditionally interpreted Article 51 as applying to armed attacks by 
states, there has been a movement towards including actions of non-state actors.  A clear 
divide has emerged between international law . . . and the practice of some states.”). 
 354.  Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 139 (July 9); see also Orr, supra note 
345, at 738. 
 355.  See supra Part II.A.1. 
 356.  WILLIAMSON, supra note 353, at 154. 
 357.  Id. at 158 (“The US policy is somewhat at odds with . . . the ICJ . . . which 
require[s] something more than dependence and control.”). 
 358.  Id. at 155; see also Kretzmer, supra note 53, at 187 (“[I]f a state sponsors or 
controls a terrorist group, and possibly even if it takes no action to prevent use of its 
territory as a base for terrorist attacks against another state, such attacks may be imputed 
to the sponsor or host state.”). 
 359.  Orr, supra note 345, at 740. 
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article referred to armed attacks carried out by any State, which supports 
the conclusion that the right of self-defense was not intended to be 
limited to attacks by State actors.360  This is similar to the dissent’s 
reasoning in the ICJ case of DRC v. Uganda, in which Judge Kooijmans 
opined that it is “unreasonable to deny the attacked State the right to 
self-defence merely because there is no attacker state.”361  In that case, 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”) alleged Uganda 
commenced military action on DRC territory in violation of the UN Charter 
and provided support to DRC armed groups seeking to overthrow the 
president.  In response, Uganda claimed its military activities were justified 
as self-defense in order to protect itself from attack by its enemies using 
the DRC as a “launching pad.”362  However, the ICJ observed that Uganda 
did not actually claim “it had been subjected to an armed attack by the 
armed forces of the DRC.”363  Moreover, there was no evidence the attacks 
could be directly or indirectly attributed to the Government of the DRC.364  
As such, Uganda could not lawfully claim it was acting in self-defense 
against the DRC.365  Judge Kooijmans disagreed, and opined that it was 
of no consequence that Uganda could not prove the DRC was directly or 
indirectly involved in the attacks; Uganda was attacked, and therefore 
entitled to exercise self-defense.366 
What about pre-emptive or active self-defense—that is, a State’s use 
of force to deter or pre-empt a possible future attack?367  The reasoning 
behind this idea is that “the State, in order to adequately defend itself, 
must be able to take the fight to the terrorist before the terrorist takes the 
fight to it.”368  Supporters of this view argue that active self-defense 
gives the State the chance to better protect itself, and has the potential to 
minimize civilian injuries.369  However, the international community 
 
 360.  Id. at 739. 
 361.  Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. 
Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, 306, ¶ 30 (Dec. 19) (separate opinion of Judge  
Kooijmans). 
 362.  See id. at 213, ¶¶ 109, 121 (majority opinion).  Uganda’s assertion of self-defense 
revolved around its claims the Sudan, its enemy, provided military assistance to the DRC 
army. 
 363.  Id. ¶ 146. The ICJ found the armed attacks came from the Allied Democratic 
Forces, a rebel group opposed to the Ugandan government. 
 364.  Id. 
 365.  Id. ¶ 147. 
 366.  Id. at 315, ¶¶ 32–35 (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans).  However, Judge 
Kooijmans agreed with the majority that Uganda’s response was disproportionate to its 
stated aim of securing the border from further armed attacks. 
 367.  WILLIAMSON, supra note 353, at 117. 
 368.  Guiora, supra note 308, at 324. 
 369.  Id. 
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does not seem eager to embrace the idea of pre-emptive self-defense.370  
The Nuremberg Tribunal was one of the first to reject this idea when 
Germany attempted to defend its invasion of Norway as self-defense.  
Germany’s attack plans on Norway were developed with the intention of 
preventing an Allied occupation at some time in the future, and not for 
the purpose of thwarting an imminent Allied landing.371  Since then, 
there have been several attempts to justify pre-emptive self-defense, 
including the 1956 Suez crisis, the 1967 Six-Day War, and the 1981 
Israeli strike on Osirak, an Iraqi nuclear reactor.372  In each of these 
cases, the self-defense argument was rejected because the required 
“triggering” armed attack had not actually occurred.373  Ironically, the 
United States, the current leader in asserting the concept of pre-emptive 
self-defense, has previously decried the idea.374 
Any action a State takes in self-defense must comply with IHL.375  
Thus, self-defense is subject to the requirements of necessity and 
proportionality.376  To meet the criteria of necessity, the need to resort to 
force in self-defense must be “instant, overwhelming, and leave no choice 
of means, and no moment for deliberation.”377  There must be a showing 
that the State had no other choice but to use force.378  Additionally, there 
must not be a significant delay between the armed attack and the State’s 
response in self-defense.379 
 
 370.   See WILLIAMSON, supra note 353, at 123–24 (as of 2008, only Israel, the 
United States, and Australia support the notion of pre-emptive self-defense); see also 
Targeted Killings Study, supra note 16, ¶ 45 (“This view is deeply contested and lacks 
support under international law.”). 
 371.   WILLIAMSON, supra note 353, at 118, n.121. 
 372.   Id. at 119–20. 
 373.   Id. at 118–19. 
 374.   See id. at 118 (“In 1949–50 the US and the UK perceived Article 51 as 
preserving a right of self-defence but not a right of pre-emptive self-defence.”). 
 375.   Kretzmer, supra note 53, at 188. 
 376.   HENDERSON, supra note 157, at 181; see also Lee, supra note 347, at 294 (“[A]ny 
use of force in self-defense must respect the principles of necessity and proportionality; 
necessity restricts the use of military force to the attainment of legitimate military 
objectives, and the proportionality requires the countermeasure adopted to be proportional to 
the threat posed.”). 
 377.   Lee, supra note 347, at 294. 
 378.   WILLIAMSON, supra note 353, at 115; see also Kretzmer, supra note 53, at 
187 (“Under the necessity principle, the victim state must not respond to the armed 
attack with force unless other means of defending itself are not available.”). 
 379.   WILLIAMSON, supra note 353, at 116. 
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To meet the proportionality requirement, the actions taken in self-
defense cannot be unreasonable or excessive,380 and they cannot exceed 
the necessity that prompts the response.381  The principle of proportionality 
in IHL dictates that when attacking a military objective,382 combatants 
must balance the force used to achieve that objective with the effects of 
that force.383  Articles 57 and 58 of AP I codified384 this principle of 
customary IHL.385  The intent of this principle is to minimize the chance 
of injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects during the hostilities.386  
The test for whether an attack is proportional is not whether attacking an 
object in a certain way would cause excessive collateral damage, but 
rather whether attacking that object at all would cause excessive collateral 
damage.387  Notably, the principle of proportionality does not entirely 
prohibit causing collateral damage; only the intentional causing of avoidable 
damage is prohibited.388  Furthermore, although single attacks that result 
in collateral damage to civilians may not prima facie violate the principle of 
proportionality, repeated attacks could give rise to a cumulative effect 
that would be in violation of IHL.389 
Proportionality dictates that a State use the least harmful means possible 
when attacking civilians who are directly participating in hostilities.390  
 
 380.   Id. at 115. 
 381.   Id. at 116. 
 382.   See HENDERSON, supra note 157, at 43, 80 (military objectives can be both 
human and non-human targets, and combatants are lawful targets); see also Sassoli & 
Olson, supra note 164, at 606 (“Combatants are part of the military potential of the 
enemy and it is therefore always lawful to attack them for the purpose of weakening that 
potential.”). 
 383.   See, e.g., Greenwood, supra note 18, at 35; Sunkavalli, supra note 178, at 
155; HENDERSON, supra note 157, at 230. 
 384.   HENDERSON, supra note 157, at 198. 
 385.   Prosecutor v. Kupresić et al., Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 524 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia) (Jan. 14, 2000) (“Such provisions, it would 
seem, are now part of customary international law, not only because they specify and 
flesh out general pre-existing norms, but also because they do not appear to be contested 
by any State, including those which have not ratified the Protocol.”). 
 386.   Id. (“[A]ny incidental (and unintentional) damage to civilians must not be out 
of proportion to the direct military advantage gained by the military attack.”). 
 387.   HENDERSON, supra note 157, at 198; see also Kupresić et al., Case No. IT-95-
16-T, ¶ 524 (“[A]ttacks, even when they are directed against legitimate military targets, 
are unlawful if conducted using indiscriminate means or methods of warfare, or in such a 
way as to cause indiscriminate damage to civilians.”). 
 388.   HENDERSON, supra note 157, at 198; Christensen, supra note 170, at 287 
(“Proportionality indicates that civilian immunity from attack is not absolute; collateral 
damage might be acceptable under certain circumstances.”). 
 389.   Kupresić, et al., Case No. IT-95-16-T, ¶ 526 (“[T]his pattern of military conduct 
may turn out to jeopardise excessively the lives and assets of civilians, contrary to the 
demands of humanity.”). 
 390.   See Israel Case, supra note 19, ¶ 40. 
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If a civilian can be captured or arrested for the purposes of interrogation 
and trial, such means should be used.391  The European Court of Human 
Rights (“ECHR”) affirmed this principle in McCann & Others v. The 
United Kingdom.  In that case, the United Kingdom authorities received 
notice of an impending terrorist attack on Gibraltar.392  United Kingdom 
and Spanish authorities planned an operation with the intent to observe 
and arrest the suspects with minimum force.393  The operation ran afoul, 
and the suspects were shot and killed by the soldiers involved in carrying 
out the operation.394  The ECHR noted the governmental authorities had 
to balance their duty to protect the lives of the people on Gibraltar while 
resorting to the minimum use of lethal force against the suspected 
terrorists.395  The authorities had the opportunity to arrest the suspects on 
arrival at the border of Gibraltar, but did not do so.396  The ECHR found 
that killing the suspects was not the least harmful means,397 and thus there 
had been a violation of Article 2 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights.398  It is important to note the ECHR specified it was examining the 
anti-terrorist operation as a whole, and not the use of force by the 
individual soldiers.399 
To summarize, targeted killings conducted in armed conflict are governed 
by IHL; human rights law governs targeted killings carried out in all 
other situations.  Combatants are “fair game” as targets of a targeted killing 
in armed conflict, but civilians may only be lawfully targeted and killed 
in armed conflict when they lose their Geneva Convention protections in 
 
 391.   Id; see also CASSESE, supra note 130, at 422 (“[W]hen it proves impossible to 
capture the suspected terrorists, belligerents may use lethal force against them only when 
it is absolutely sure that civilians are taking active part in hostilities and as an extrema 
ratio, when any other method has proved or may reasonably prove pointless.”). 
 392.   McCann and Others v. United Kingdom, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. 97, 103, ¶ 13 
(1996). 
 393.   Id. at 104, ¶ 17–18. 
 394.   Id. at 114, ¶¶ 59–67.  The soldiers admitted they shot to kill.  See id. at 141, 
¶ 199. 
 395.   Id. at 142, ¶ 207. 
 396.   Id. ¶ 208. 
 397.   See id. at 143, ¶ 213. 
 398.   Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
art. 2(2)(a), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (“Deprivation of life shall not be regarded 
as inflicted in contravention of this Article when it results from the use of force which is 
no more than absolutely necessary in defence of any person from unlawful violence.”). 
 399.   McCann, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 100, ¶ 6(e) (The use of force may be justified 
“where it is based on an honest belief which is perceived, for good reasons, to be valid at 
the time but which subsequently turns out to be mistaken.”). 
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some way, such as if they directly participate in hostilities.  The United 
States’ position is that its right of self-defense under Article 51 of the 
UN Charter permits it to target members of al Qaeda, the Taliban, and 
their supporters and attack them via drone strike in Yemen, Somalia, and 
Pakistan.  Outside of situations of armed conflict, self-defense may only 
be invoked where there has been an armed attack upon a State by a State 
actor, or by a non-State actor whose actions may be imputed to a State. 
V. LEGAL STATUS OF CIA OFFICERS INVOLVED IN                               
TARGETED DRONE STRIKES 
A.  Are the CIA Officers Operating Inside an Armed Conflict? 
1.  Armed Conflict with al Qaeda in Afghanistan 
As noted above, the first step in the analysis of a CIA officer’s legal 
status is to determine whether the CIA is operating within an armed 
conflict.  The United States considers itself to be involved in an armed 
conflict with specific terrorist groups, namely, al Qaeda, the Taliban, and 
those who support them.400  It justifies this armed conflict classification 
with Congress’s 2001 Authorization of the Use of Military Force.401  
This gave the President “the power ‘to use all necessary and appropriate 
force’ against those responsible for the terrorists [sic] attacks realized in 
New York, Virginia, and Pennsylvania on September 11, 2001.”402  Both 
Presidents Bush and Obama have relied on the 2001 Authorization to 
justify the use of drones to target and kill suspected al Qaeda operatives 
and their supporters.403  The Authorization is based on the idea that the 
September 11 terror attacks were an armed attack upon the United States 
by a transnational terrorist organization, thus permitting the United States to 
invoke its right of self-defense under the UN Charter.404 
On October 7, 2001, the United States informed the UN Security 
Council of its initiation of military action against al Qaeda and the Taliban 
government.405  It justified this action as an exercise of its right of self-
defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter,406 with the events of September 
 
 400.   Vogel, supra note 7, at 102, n.5. 
 401.   Id. at 107; Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107–40, 115 
Stat. 224 (2001). 
 402.   Kramer, supra note 12, at 378. 
 403.   Vogel, supra note 7, at 105, 107. 
 404.   Id. at 108; see also Weiner, supra note 13, at 141 (“On September 11, the 
United States sustained an assault that qualifies, in scale and effect, as an ‘armed attack’ 
that would justify the use of force in self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.”). 
 405.  Weiner, supra note 13, at 139. 
 406.  Id. 
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11 as the armed attack prompting the response.  At the time, al Qaeda’s 
operations were based in Afghanistan, and the country was under the 
control of the Taliban.407  The United States argued that the Taliban 
government was supporting al Qaeda.408 The Taliban “maintained some 
form of governance over Afghanistan, occupied the capital, conducted 
foreign relations, and proved to be the most powerful military force in 
the country.”409  When the United States-United Kingdom allies intervened 
in Afghanistan, the ensuing hostilities became an armed conflict.410 
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the view that the United 
States is in an armed conflict with al Qaeda in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.411  
In that case, the Supreme Court examined whether the procedures adopted 
to try Hamdan, a Yemeni national charged with various terrorism-related 
charges, violated the Geneva Conventions.412 Hamdan was captured 
during hostilities between the United States and the Taliban, was handed 
over to the American military, and transferred to a military prison in 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.413  President Bush deemed him eligible to be 
tried by a military commission, and Hamdan claimed this was a violation of 
international law.414  The Supreme Court held that the structure of the 
military commission violated the Geneva Conventions; furthermore, the 
Court noted Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applied to 
non-international armed conflicts, and was applicable to the conflict with 
al Qaeda.415  This holding is consistent with IHL; recall that an international 
armed conflict is a conflict between two States, and a non-international 
armed conflict takes place inside a State’s borders between that State’s 
government and an armed group.  Indeed, despite the United States 
government’s insistence to the contrary in Hamdan, it cannot be in an 
 
 407.  Kramer, supra note 12, at 379. 
 408.  Kretzmer, supra note 53, at 196. 
 409.  Vogel, supra note 7, at 112. 
 410.  Marouda, supra note 79, at 229; see also Vogel, supra note 7, at 111 (“[T]he 
United States was at least initially engaged in an international armed conflict with the 
Taliban as the functional government of Afghanistan, and with al Qaeda forces supporting the 
Taliban as a kind of militia.”). 
 411.  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 412.  Id. at 560. 
 413.  Id. at 566. 
 414.  Id. at 566–67. 
 415.  Id. at 630–33; see also Radsan & Murphy, supra note 5, at 1210 (“The Supreme 
Court . . . held that the conflict with Al Qaeda should be regarded as ‘noninternational’ 
because the conflict was not between states even though it spills over international 
borders.”). 
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international armed conflict with al Qaeda because al Qaeda, quite simply, 
is not a State.416 
Furthermore, the two elements required to cross the threshold of an 
armed conflict are the intensity of the conflict and the organization of the 
parties thereto.  The level of intensity required for an armed conflict 
must be such that it is distinguishable from situations of internal conflict 
or terrorist activities.  Recall, that the criteria used to make this 
determination can include the protracted nature of the conflict, the 
seriousness of the hostilities, the types of weapons used by the parties, the 
spread of armed clashes throughout the territory, the number of casualties, 
and whether the hostilities have caught the attention of the UN Security 
Council.  Aside from the fact that the very purpose of the intensity 
requirement is to distinguish armed conflict from terrorist activities, it 
has been argued that the intensity prong is met because al Qaeda is 
responsible for a large number of American casualties.417  Additionally, 
the Security Council has passed multiple resolutions regarding the situation 
in Afghanistan, including Resolution 1373, passed on September 28, 
2001, which reaffirmed the collective right of self-defense under the UN 
Charter and directed States to prevent the financing of terrorism, refrain 
from supporting individuals involved in terrorism, and take steps to prevent 
terror attacks.418  Since Resolution 1373, the Security Council also passed 
Resolution 1378 (passed on November 14, 2001, in which it condemned 
the Taliban for allowing Afghanistan to be used as a base for terrorism),419 
and Resolution 1383 (passed on December 6, 2001, it reaffirmed Resolution 
1378),420 among others. 
The second element requires that al Qaeda be considered an organized 
armed group.  Al Qaeda does maintain a minimal level of organization, 
has some form of a command structure, and engages in violence against 
the United States.421  One author suggests the evidence that al Qaeda is 
 
 416.  See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 628–29. 
 417.  See Orr, supra note 345, at 742; Weiner, supra note 13, at 141 (“Thus, 
although the United States’s war on terrorism does not meet the definition of war under 
positive international law, the nature of the violence that has been inflicted on the United 
States, the character and goals of the al-Qaeda organization responsible for that violence, 
and the presence of an ongoing threat, together provided justifiable prima facie functional 
grounds for the United States to extend the war regime to the conflict with al-Qaeda.”). 
 418.   S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
 419.   S.C. Res. 1378, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1378 (Nov. 14, 2001). 
 420.   S.C. Res. 1383, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1383 (Dec. 6, 2001). 
 421.   Kramer, supra note 12, at 383 (“[B]oth the Taliban and al-Qaida maintain a 
minimal level of organization.  Both have identifiable leadership: Muhammed Omar and 
Osama bin Laden’s closest officials, respectively, along with their underling commanders.  
The Taliban’s command structure seems to hinge on its leader and the Council of United 
Mujahedeen, while al-Qaida is run by the structure of vertical leadership established by 
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able to carry out military operations includes its previous attacks, such as 
the attack on American military personnel in Yemen in 1992, the 1993 
World Trade Center bombing, and the London bombings of 2005.422  
Evidence of al Qaeda’s hierarchical command structure includes the fact 
that it has bylaws, committee structures, and rules for succession, as well 
as regional commanders, personnel records, and multiple tiers of 
management.423  Thus, the two elements for armed conflict have been 
met, and the United States is in a non-international armed conflict with 
al Qaeda in Afghanistan. 
2.  Armed Conflict with al Qaeda Outside Afghanistan 
However, American drone strikes on members of al Qaeda have not 
been limited to inside Afghanistan’s borders.  It has also attacked members 
of al Qaeda and the Taliban in areas outside the “geographical battlefield,” 
including Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia.  The United States’ reasoning 
is that because it is in an armed conflict with al Qaeda, it can use force 
against its leaders wherever they are located.424  Thus, the question 
becomes whether the United States is in an armed conflict with al Qaeda 
in States outside Afghanistan and can lawfully target al Qaeda members 
there. 
The issue that surfaces here is the legality of the use of force in 
self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.  The United States claims 
it is the victim of an armed attack by al Qaeda.  But, al Qaeda is not a 
State actor, and the majority view is that the exercise of self-defense 
requires the armed attack either be committed by a State actor or, in the 
case of non-State actors, be imputable to a State.  The United States 
claimed that because al Qaeda was based in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan 
 
bin Laden.  Both groups continue to use armed violence to resist the NATO forces in 
Afghanistan.  At least the Taliban also fights against the Afghani government, as 
evidenced in the violence it demonstrated around the September 2010 parliamentary 
elections.”); see also Weiner, supra note 13, at 141 (“al-Qaeda seems to possess . . . clear, 
albeit decentralized, organizational and command structures.  In addition, al-Qaeda had 
declared its intention, as an organization, to engage in violence against the United States 
for the political purpose of altering United States foreign policy on key issues.”). 
 422.  Orr, supra note 345, at 743. 
 423.  Id. at 743–44; see also Matt Thompson, Even Terrorists Have to Fill Out 
Expense Reports, NPR (May 30, 2013, 10:16 AM), http://www.npr.org/2013/05/29/18714 
7334/even-terrorists-have-to-fill-out-expense-reports. 
 424.  Yoo, supra note 199, at 63. 
CLINE (DO NOT DELETE, OR ADD TEXT IN THIS AREA) 10/19/2016  5:20 PM 
 
108 
at the time of the September 11 attacks, it could lawfully respond with 
the use of force in Afghanistan.  Furthermore, the UN Security Council 
passed a resolution that “gave the US free rein in indicating the ‘inherent 
right of individual and collective self-defence in accordance to the Charter,’ 
as well as specifying the need to ‘bring to justice those responsible for 
aiding, supporting, or harbouring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors 
of these acts,’ and holding them accountable.”425  This supported the United 
States position that its military response was justified by the principle of 
self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.426 
Regarding the link with al Qaeda to Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, 
recall that a State may be held responsible for the actions of non-State 
actors if it fails to prevent the effects of that non-State actor’s conduct.  
The United States claims that, “since 2002, there is a zone close to the 
Pakistan border, used by the Taliban to find shelter, organize and launch 
attacks.  Pakistan forces tolerate the conduct, or cannot control the area, 
or are involved in the fighting in a number of ways.”427  While critics of 
American drone strikes in Yemen argue that since the United States is 
not officially involved in an armed conflict in Yemen the use of force 
against members of al Qaeda there is unlawful,428 the United States 
currently has Pakistan’s permission to target al Qaeda members inside 
Pakistan’s borders.429 Due to Pakistan’s consent, there is no sovereignty 
violation, and the United States can freely target suspected members of 
al Qaeda and the Taliban located in Pakistan.  Yemen’s president recently 
acknowledged that he has permitted the drone strikes in Yemen;430 
so, like in Pakistan, there is no sovereignty violation. 
That leaves Somalia.  The most enticing benefit of the existence of an 
armed conflict between the United States and al Qaeda in these countries 
is the United States gains powers under the lex specialis of IHL that 
 
 425.  Gilles Dorronsoro, The Security Council and the Afghan Conflict, in THE UNITED 
NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND WAR 452, 463 (Vaughan Lowe et al. eds., 2008). 
 426.  Id. at 463–64. 
 427.  Marouda, supra note 79, at 229.  But see Orr, supra note 345, at 739 (“Al Qaeda’s 
activities, of course, are not attributable to Pakistan even if Pakistan’s intelligence 
service has turned a blind eye toward their operation.”). 
 428.  Ackerman, supra note 2 (“‘The United States is not involved in any armed 
conflict in Yemen,’ O’Connell tells Danger Room, ‘so to use military force to carry out 
these killings violates international law.’”). 
 429.  Orr, supra note 345, at 733, 736. 
 430.  Greg Miller, In Interview, Yemeni President Acknowledges Approving U.S. 
Drone Strikes, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ 
national-security/yemeni-president-acknowledges-approving-us-drone-strikes/2012/09/29/09 
bec2ae-0a56-11e2-afff-d6c7f20a83bf_story.html?tid=wp_ipad (“Yemen’s leader said . . . 
that he personally approves every U.S. drone strike in his country.”). 
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otherwise would not apply.431  Significantly, the United States would gain 
broader authority to target and kill al Qaeda members and their supporters 
in Somalia than if only human rights law applied.432  Without the ability 
to impute al Qaeda’s actions to Somalia, it does not appear that the United 
States can successfully claim self-defense in this country, as it treads too 
closely to pre-emptive self-defense, an idea not yet accepted by the 
international community.  Thus, the drone strikes being conducted in 
Somalia are outside the context of armed conflict, and only human rights 
law applies. 
B.  Legal Classification of CIA Officers 
The CIA is a governmental agency and is not part of the armed forces 
of the United States.  In fact, many of the CIA’s employees are retired 
military personnel.433  President Bush issued an order that authorized the 
CIA to kill or capture leaders of terrorist organizations, including al 
Qaeda.434  The CIA drone strike program in Pakistan began after September 
11, 2001 “with a drone strike in Yemen in November 2002, but the 
program has expanded greatly, especially in Pakistan, under the Obama 
administration.”435  Civilian employees at the CIA headquarters in Langley, 
Virginia, operate its drone fleet, under the control of the agency’s 
Counterterrorism Center.436  In addition, CIA personnel near hidden 
airfields in Afghanistan and Pakistan handle the takeoffs and landings of 
these drones.437  CIA officers pilot the drones in Langley by using joysticks 
as they watch a live video feed from a camera on board the drone.438  
Thus, their legal status when acting under the authorization to target 
suspected terrorists is not immediately clear. 
The possible categories include combatant, noncombatant, members 
of an organized armed group, civilian, mercenary, civilian contractor, 
and prisoner of war.  The mercenary, civilian contractor and prisoner of 
war categories can quickly be eliminated.  AP I 47(2)(d) provides that 
 
 431.  Kretzmer, supra note 53, at 196. 
 432.  See id. at 200 (“Are we back to a licence to kill all persons suspected of being 
active members of the international terrorist group?”). 
 433.  Alston, supra note 6, at 329. 
 434.  Yoo, supra note 200, at 59. 
 435.  Alston, supra note 6,at 329–30. 
 436.  Id. 
 437.  Id. 
 438.  Orr, supra note 345, at 735. 
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mercenaries are not nationals of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of 
territory controlled by a Party to the conflict; thus, the mercenary 
classification would not apply here.  CIA officers are therefore not 
mercenaries, as they have legal ties to the United States, and they are 
employed by a United States agency, likely have American nationality, 
and presumably reside in the United States, where the drones are being 
controlled. Furthermore, CIA employees are not private contractors; they 
are themselves employees of a governmental agency.  Although they 
sometimes engage in targeted kill/missions in conjunction with the 
Department of Defense,439 this activity is not enough to qualify them as 
civilian contractors.  They are not prisoners of war because they have 
not been captured by the enemy. 
CIA officers are not combatants due to the fact that they are not 
members of the United States armed forces.440  Some CIA employees are 
retired military personnel who gave up their combatant status upon 
retirement from the armed forces.  Although CIA officers may supply 
intelligence information to military officials, they are not subordinate to 
them or part of the “military chain of command.”441  Furthermore, CIA 
officers neither wear a military uniform, nor display a fixed and distinctive 
emblem.442  Despite government authority to “seek and kill” terrorists, 
this is not enough to qualify them as combatants.  CIA officers are also 
not noncombatants.  They are not war correspondents, current members 
of the merchant marine, medical or religious personnel, quartermasters, 
or members of the military administration and legal services. 
CIA officers are not members of an organized armed group.  This actor 
classification is specific to non-international armed conflicts, such as the 
type that exists between the United States and al Qaeda.  However, 
organized armed groups are groups that conduct hostilities on behalf of a 
non-State party in an armed conflict; CIA officers are employees of a 
government agency, and if they were to conduct hostilities, it would be 
on behalf of the United States, a State party.  Thus, this category does not 
apply. 
Therefore, CIA officers are civilians, as they do not meet the 
requirements of any other category.  This means CIA officers are protected 
from being targeted and attacked by the enemy in times of armed 
conflict as long as they refrain from taking part in the hostilities.  But, 
 
 439.  See Alston, supra note 6, at 285. 
 440.  Mary Ellen O’Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study 
of Pakistan, 2004–2009, in SHOOTING TO KILL: SOCIO-LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE USE 
OF LETHAL FORCE 263, 270 (Simon Bronitt et al. ed., 2011). 
 441.  Id. 
 442.  See id. 
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civilians are not entirely prohibited from participating in hostilities; if 
CIA officers do directly participate in hostilities, they will not lose their 
civilian status, but rather their civilian immunity for as long as they 
participate in the hostilities.443  The next step is to analyze what activities are 
sufficient to constitute direct participation in hostilities.  Does “pushing the 
button” on a drone attack qualify? 
1.  Are the CIA Officers Carrying Out the Drone Strikes Directly 
Participating in Hostilities? 
Recall that the three elements required for a civilian to be directly 
participating in hostilities are: the threshold of harm, direct causation 
between the harm and the act, and a belligerent nexus.444  Regarding the 
first element, the civilian’s act must be directed toward inflicting harm 
on the enemy or enemy property.  That requirement is met here; the CIA 
officers direct the drone strike at the target, an individual who has been 
deemed an “enemy combatant” due to his or her alleged status as a member 
of al Qaeda, the Taliban, or a supporter of either group.  The drone strike 
is directed toward eliminating the enemy, so the CIA officer’s actions 
cross the threshold of harm required for direct participation in hostilities.  
Next, there must be a direct a link between the harm likely to be caused 
by the civilian act and the act itself.  This element requires that the act is 
committed with the specific intent to cause that harm.  This element is 
also fulfilled because the CIA officer participating in the drone strike 
intends to kill the targeted individual.  Finally, the third element, the 
belligerent nexus, requires that the act must be done with the intention of 
benefiting one party to the armed conflict at the other party’s detriment.  
The CIA officers participating in drone strikes intend to eliminate the 
threat of terrorism by killing al Qaeda members and destroying their 
network.  Thus, the elements for direct participation in hostilities are 
fulfilled, and CIA officers participating in drone strikes are civilians directly 
participating in hostilities. 
 
 443.  Vogel, supra note 7, at 135; Targeted Killings Study, supra note 16, ¶ 71; 
ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 81, ¶ 1942. 
 444.  See supra Part III(C)(i) 
CLINE (DO NOT DELETE, OR ADD TEXT IN THIS AREA) 10/19/2016  5:20 PM 
 
112 
C.  Consequences of Applying Civilian Status to CIA Officers 
Now that the legal status of CIA officers engaged in drone strikes has 
been established, the next question is what the consequences of that 
status are.  Generally, CIA officers are civilians.  As civilians, the CIA 
officers are protected from being targeted by the enemy, which in this 
case is al Qaeda and the Taliban.  Civilians are not completely barred 
from participating in the hostilities; they may choose to become involved in 
the conflict.  If they do so, they do not lose their civilian status, but they 
will lose their protection from being targeted.  Thus, it is not illegal for 
the CIA officers to carry out the targeted drone strikes against members 
of al Qaeda.  Because they are directly participating in hostilities by 
engaging in such an act, they may themselves be targeted and killed for 
the duration of their participation in the drone strike.445  This is unlikely, 
as the CIA officers are located safely in Langley, Virginia, far away 
from Afghanistan, Yemen, Pakistan, and Somalia. 
By participating in the targeted killings, the CIA officers could be 
exposing themselves to criminal charges.446  As a result, CIA officers 
risk prosecution under the domestic law of a country where they participated 
in a targeted killing outside of armed conflict.447  Although intelligence 
officers are usually entitled to diplomatic privileges and immunities,448 
CIA officers who have directly participated in a targeted killing will 
likely not enjoy such diplomat status.449  If a CIA officer, suspected of 
participating in a drone attack, were to travel to the country where the 
strike was carried out, he or she could be detained by that country’s 
authorities and tried for unlawful participation in the hostilities.450 
CIA officers could also be prosecuted for violations of any applicable 
United States laws.451  However, the United States would not likely 
permit the domestic prosecution of CIA officers for their participation in 
targeted drone strikes.452  Other domestic lawsuits could arise, such as 
the one recently filed by the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”).  
 
 445.  Targeted Killings Study, supra note 16, ¶ 71. 
 446.  See Alston, supra note 6, at 369–70. 
 447.  Targeted Killings Study, supra note 16, at ¶¶ 70–71. 
 448.  Id. (“[T]he practice is that intelligence operatives are often accorded diplomatic 
status by the sending country.  In other words, they actually are or are represented to be 
diplomats and are thus entitled to diplomatic privileges and immunities, including immunity 
from host state prosecution.”). 
 449.  Id. (“But CIA operatives involved in targeted killings will often not enjoy 
accredited status as diplomats.”). 
 450.  See id. 
 451.  Id. 
 452.  Id. at 400 (“[T]he CIA itself will go to great lengths to avoid any criminal 
prosecution of its personnel.”). 
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The ACLU is currently suing several United States officials over the death 
of al-Awlaki, the United States citizen killed in Yemen in September 
2011; the lawsuit alleges his targeted killing by the CIA violates the 
Fourth and Fifth amendments of the United States Constitution.453 
The best solution is to transfer the responsibility for carrying out drone 
strikes entirely to the United States armed forces.  The targeting of al 
Qaeda members is within their lawful combatant duties, and would 
eliminate potential criminal exposure for CIA officers currently engaged 
in drone strike activities.  Furthermore, it would remove the confusion 
and sense of secrecy surrounding the program. The rules the Air Force 
must follow are clear, as they are dictated by IHL, while the rules that 
govern the CIA are not as clear, and in fact, unknown to the public.454  
This shift might quiet the growing chorus of voices critical of the CIA’s 
drone strike program.  Finally, one author points out that by directly 
participating in hostilities, the CIA exposes not only its operatives to 
attack by the enemy, but also the CIA’s physical assets.455  These physical 
assets have been used so frequently in the “war on terror” that they may 
be considered to offer a military advantage, and thus may be lawfully 
targeted by members of al Qaeda and the Taliban as a valid military 
objective.456 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In response to the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, the United 
States asserted its right of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter 
to justify the targeting and killing of members of al Qaeda.  To this end, 
the United States has utilized drones to target and attack members of al 
Qaeda located in Afghanistan, Yemen, Pakistan, and Somalia.  These drone 
attacks have increased in frequency since they first began in 2002, and 
have been carried out by members of the American armed forces, as well 
as CIA officers.  Each strike triggers increased criticism of the drone 
program.  These attacks raise concerns about the legality of the CIA’s 
 
 453.  Anthony Bartkewicz, ACLU Suing U.S. Over Drone Killings of Citizens in 
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 454.  See Alston, supra note 6, at 359. 
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participation in the drone attacks; specifically, whether the CIA officers 
carrying out the attacks may lawfully do so as the drone strikes are carried 
out under the guise of armed conflict. 
The CIA is a civilian agency authorized by the President to kill leaders 
of al Qaeda, the Taliban, and their supporters, in the armed conflict with 
al Qaeda.  CIA officers are civilians; as such, they are not members of 
the armed forces, so they are not entitled to take part in hostilities in times 
of armed conflict.  However, if they choose to engage in the hostilities, 
they will be considered civilians directly participating in hostilities, and 
will lose their civilian immunity for the duration of their participation in 
the hostilities. 
Thus, the CIA officers who participate in the drone strikes are civilians 
directly participating in hostilities.  They are directing the drone strike at 
the enemy, a specified individual al Qaeda member, with the intent that 
the strike will kill the target and inflict further damage on the terrorist 
network.  The CIA officers engaged in these attacks may be targeted for 
the duration of their participation, since their participation does not result in 
the loss of civilian status, only their civilian immunity.  Additionally, 
after the CIA officer’s participation ceases, he or she may still be subject 
to punitive measures for such participation.  Therefore, the United States 
should rely entirely upon its armed forces to carry out the drone strikes, 
as it is legal for combatants to target the enemy—here, members of al 
Qaeda—within the arena of armed conflict.  Transferring this duty to the 
armed forces would remove the secrecy and subsequent questions of 
legality surrounding the drone attacks.  Moreover, continuing to allow 
CIA officers to engage in drone strike activities places CIA personnel at 
risk not only of criminal liability for their participation in the hostilities, 
but also to attack by the enemy while carrying out the drone strike. 
